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ABSTRACT 
Gonzalo De Asis Ruiz: Corporate Debt and Distress Risk in Emerging Markets 
(Under the direction of Anusha Chari) 
This dissertation consists of two papers in the field of international finance, both under 
the general theme of corporate distress in emerging markets. In the first paper, I explore how the 
leverage and size of emerging market firms relates to their financial fragility. I also show that 
idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have macroeconomic effects. In the second paper, I estimate 
an emerging market-specific measure of distress risk and explore its asset pricing implications. I 
find that global financial conditions help explain changes in firms’ probability of default, and 
that distressed stocks earn a premium over their safer counterparts. 
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CHAPTER 1: IN SEARCH OF DISTRESS RISK IN EMERGING MARKETS1 
1.1 Overview 
Although the non-financial corporate sector accounts for the lion’s share of the post-
Global Financial Crisis surge in emerging-market leverage, there is little systematic research on 
factors that impact corporate distress risk in emerging markets. We suggest that bankruptcy risk 
models developed using US data do not account for emerging market vulnerabilities to global 
shocks such as advanced economy monetary policy changes, US dollar movements, or shifts in 
global liquidity and risk aversion. A novel multi-country dataset of corporate defaults allows us 
to develop a logit model of distress risk specific to emerging markets, as well as quantify the 
importance of global shocks on emerging market corporate distress. While Leverage, Cash, and 
Profitability have the largest marginal effects on the probability of default, US interest rates and 
US equity volatility are positively correlated with default risk. We also find that the set of global 
factors contributes more predictive power than domestic macroeconomic variables and that the 
effect of a global "risk-off" environment on default risk is greater for firms whose returns 
respond more negatively to such global conditions. Using our best measure of probability of 
default, we construct distress-sorted portfolios and find monotonically increasing 12-month 
realized returns in distress risk, even after controlling for Fama-French factors, momentum, 
short-term reversal, and long-term reversal. A number of robustness tests confirm the presence of 
a positive distress risk premium in emerging market equities.  
                                                 
1 Co-authored by Asis, G., and Chari, A.  
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1.2 Introduction 
Non-financial corporate debt in emerging markets surged from $4 trillion in 2004 to over 
$25 trillion in 2016 (IIF, 2017). In view of heightened levels of leverage and worsening solvency 
positions, there is rising concern about the deteriorating health of emerging market firms (IMF, 
2015).2 Recent evidence also suggests that the share of debt held by troubled firms is the highest 
in over a decade (IMF, 2015). Whether through links with the global financial system or through 
macroeconomic effects, a wave of corporate defaults in emerging markets could trigger broader 
financial stress (Shin, 2013; McCauley et al., 2015; Acharya et al., 2015; Beltran et al., 2017). 
Yet there is little systematic research on the determinants of corporate distress specific to 
emerging markets.3 An exception is Altman (2005), who adapts a longstanding bankruptcy risk 
model (Altman, 1968) to the idiosyncrasies of emerging market firms. Recent approaches 
principally focused on US data have made significant strides to further develop the 
methodologies to measure probabilities of default. Notable examples are the frailty factor models 
introduced by Duffie et al. (2009); the forward intensity model in Duan et al. (2012); and the 
logit models put forth by Shumway (2001) and refined by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 
(2008). However, we find that logit models proposed for US firms perform sub-optimally when 
applied directly to the emerging market context. 
This paper uses a novel dataset on emerging market corporate defaults to fill the existing 
gap. We suggest that extant models do not account for emerging market vulnerabilities to global 
macro shocks such as advanced economy monetary policy changes, US dollar movements, or 
shifts in global liquidity and risk aversion. Our objective is to develop an optimal model of 
                                                 
2 "IMF Flashes Warning Lights for $18 Trillion in Emerging-Market Corporate Debt," Wall Street Journal, 
September 25, 2015. 
3 We use "default risk" and "distress risk" interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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distress risk that allows us to quantify the importance of global shocks on corporate distress in 
emerging markets as a class of assets. Given the documented spillover effects of advanced 
economy monetary shocks (Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub, 2016; Chen, Mancini Griffoli, and 
Sahay, 2014) and the impact of changes in international investor risk tolerance on emerging 
market capital flows (Rey, 2015; Chari, Dilts, and Lundblad, 2017), we suggest that a set of 
global financial variables play an important role in predicting corporate distress in emerging 
markets.  
For instance, the currency denomination of emerging market corporate debt is a 
significant source of concern. US dollar appreciation raises the local currency value of dollar-
denominated liabilities with adverse effects on firm balance sheets (Calvo et al., 2008; Schneider 
and Tornell, 2004). Borrowers residing in emerging markets account for over a third of global 
dollar credit to non-banks outside the US, and dollar bond issuance doubled between 2009 and 
2015 (McCauley et al., 2015). Bruno and Shin (2016) use BIS data to show that issuance of 
international debt securities in foreign currency by non-financial corporations also rose 
significantly between 2001 and 2015. Changes in global monetary conditions exacerbate fears 
about currency risk. In particular, monetary policy normalization in advanced economies is a key 
risk for emerging market firms. Powell (2014) highlights concerns about global debt paired with 
other macro conditions, such as the risk of asset price drops and currency depreciation, that could 
damage the ability of emerging market firms to repay their debts.4 
We estimate a logit model of probability of corporate default on a set of firm-specific 
accounting and market variables, as well as variables reflecting global financial conditions. The 
evidence suggests that the 5-year US Treasury rate, the Fed funds rate, and the VIX are 
                                                 
4 "Prospects for Emerging Market Economies in a Normalizing Global Economy," Speech by Jerome Powell, 
October 12 2017. 
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correlated with distress risk, even after controlling for firm-specific variables and country fixed 
effects. Furthermore, introducing a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has defaulted in 
the past has a very positive impact on the model’s predictive power – a novel result in the 
literature, to the best of our knowledge. A model that includes both types of variables and the 
prior-default dummy yields a much higher explanatory power for emerging market firms than 
Campbell et al.’s (2008) specification of accounting and market variables. Furthermore, their 
model has lower predictive power in sample than ours out of sample. 
Computing marginal effects of our probability of default model allows us to speak about 
the economic significance of our coefficients. Leverage and Cash have the largest average 
marginal effects on the probability of default – a one-standard-deviation increase in the predictor 
is associated with 0.4 and -0.52 percentage point changes in the probability of default, 
respectively. From the set of global variables, DFX and 5-year Treasury Rate have the largest 
average marginal effects. Plots of predicted probabilities – for all values of each explanatory 
variable while keeping all other predictors constant at their mean – reveal variations in the range 
and curvature of these marginal effects. 
Next, we focus on firms whose returns are most sensitive to global financial conditions in 
order to explore whether stock returns carry information about the impact of the global financial 
environment on default risk. We label these sensitivities "global betas", and they are extracted 
from firm-specific time series regressions of stock returns on a global variable, controlling for 
market returns. Introducing dummies for the tercile of firms with most negative global betas (i.e., 
firms most negatively affected by increases in the US dollar, sovereign spreads, US interest rates, 
VIX, and TED spread) reveals that, for 5-year Treasury rates, VIX, and TED spread, the effect of 
increases in the global variable on the probability of default is larger for firms with most negative 
5 
betas. Furthermore, a composite global beta measure helps us show that the effect of a global 
risk-off environment on distress risk is greater for firms whose returns respond more negatively 
to such global conditions. 
Lastly, we explore the asset pricing implications of our measure of distress risk. Asset 
pricing theory suggests investors should demand a premium for holding stocks at risk of default. 
However, prior literature using US data finds that distress risk and future stock returns move in 
opposite directions. We construct ten portfolios sorted by firms’ predicted probability of default 
and find strong evidence of the presence of a distress risk premium in emerging market stocks. 
Future 12-month stock returns are monotonically increasing in the probability of corporate 
default, a trend that holds true after controlling for the Fama-French three factors, momentum, 
short-term reversal, and long-term reversal. 
Our paper contributes to the existing corporate default literature in three ways. First, it 
determines precisely which accounting, market, and macroeconomic variables are associated 
with corporate distress risk in emerging markets – and compares them to those in advanced 
economies. A number of fundamental idiosyncrasies suggest a modified approach to analyze 
corporate vulnerabilities in an emerging market setting. For example, Mendoza and Terrones 
(2008) find that corporate credit booms in emerging markets are followed by larger 
macroeconomic responses, such as drops in output, investment, and consumption, than in 
advanced economies. Further, credit expansions are determined by different factors in the two 
sets of economies: financial reforms and productivity gains in advanced economies and large 
capital inflows in emerging markets. Given the surge in "search for yield" flows from advanced 
economies to emerging markets during the unconventional monetary policy period, concerns 
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about reversals in these flows during monetary policy normalization in advanced economies 
could exacerbate corporate distress risk in emerging markets. 
Second, the paper improves current tools to predict corporate distress in emerging 
markets. Instead of simply estimating US-based models using emerging market data, our 
specification includes a set of explanatory variables that maximizes predictive power for 
emerging markets. Additionally, the introduction of stock returns’ sensitivities to global factors 
adds a new dimension to our understanding of how distress risk operates through financial 
markets. Third, we find a positive distress risk premium in emerging market stocks by examining 
the pricing of financially distressed firms. We use the probability of default measure developed 
in the first part of the paper to explore the performance of distressed stocks between 2002 and 
2015. 
Related Literature: Shumway (2001) introduces a multiple logit model that combines 
accounting data with a set of market variables comprised of market size, past stock returns, 
idiosyncratic standard deviation of stock returns, net income to total assets, and total liabilities to 
total assets. Chava and Jarrow (2004) improve forecasting by shortening the observation 
intervals to monthly frequency and find the existence of an industry effect. Campbell et al. 
(2008) build on the work of Shumway (2001). Their paper uses US data to show that firms are 
more likely to enter distress if they have higher leverage, lower profitability, lower market 
capitalization, lower past stock returns, more volatile past stock returns, lower cash holdings, 
higher market-to-book ratios, and lower prices per share.5 An important asset pricing implication 
                                                 
5 The authors define distress as either filing for bankruptcy, getting delisted, or receiving a D rating. The authors use Shumway’s 
(2001) specification as base and make modifications that improve the model’s predictive power. First, they divide net income and 
leverage (both explanatory variables) by market value of assets instead of book value. Second, they add corporate cash holdings, 
Tobin’s Q, and price per share to the set of explanatory variables. Third, they study default forecasts at different horizons, finding 
market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, and equity volatility the most consistently predictive characteristics of corporate 
distress, and demonstrating the increased importance of balance sheet versus market variables as the horizon increases. 
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of Campbell et al. (2008) is that stocks of distressed companies experience abnormally low 
returns. 
Das et al. (2007) prove that the models mentioned above don’t explain all the systematic 
risk that contributes to firms’ probability of default. Duffie et al. (2009) introduce frailty factors 
– latent common factors – that help explain these shared risks, though at the expense of 
computational ease. In an attempt to reduce the computational burden, Duan and Fulop (2013) 
combine frailty factors with a forward intensity approach first developed in Duan et al. (2012). 
Another recent alternative is proposed by Creal et al. (2013) through Generalized Autoregressive 
Score (GAS) models, expanded by Chen et al. (2016) by incorporating multiple frailty factors. 
Although not as closely related to this paper, a branch of the literature has developed 
structural models of default risk. The most influential structural approach was pioneered by 
Merton (1974) and improved by Oldrich Vasicek and Stephen Kealhofer (Vasicek, 1984; 
Kealhofer, 2003a; Kealhofer, 2003b) in what became known as the Vasicek-Kealhofer (VK) 
model. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) base on these prior works their Distance to Default (DTD) 
measure: DTD = Firm Net Worth / (Market Value of Assets ∙ Asset Volatility). Because a firm 
will default when its net worth reaches zero, its distance to default will also equal zero at that 
point. The authors then translate this structure into a probability of default by empirically 
mapping DTD and historical US default data. 
A small set of papers develop bankruptcy models for emerging markets. Notably, to 
adjust the Z-Score to the different environment in emerging markets Altman (2005) introduces 
the modified Z-score.6 Pomerleano (1998) uses accounting ratios to study the build-up of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, finding excess leverage and poor capital performance in the years leading 
                                                 
6 More information on the specifics of the modified Z-score model derivation can be found in Altman (2005). 
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up to the crisis. Subsequent studies focus on expanding the types of variables included in the 
predictive model (Hernandez-Tinoco and Wilson, 2013) and applying US-specific determinants 
of bankruptcy to other countries (e.g. Kordlar and Nikbakht, 2011; Xu and Zhang, 2009; Bauer 
and Agarwal, 2013; NUS-RMI, 2016). 
Other related research focuses on specific financial sheet variables to identify country-
wide corporate distress risk. Alfaro et al. (2017) use firm-level data to show that corporate 
fragility is currently less severe but more widespread in emerging markets than during the build-
up of the Asian Financial Crisis. The paper shows that the correlation between leverage and 
corporate fragility is time-varying and strongest for large firms and times of local currency 
devaluations. Chui et al. (2014) and Bruno and Shin (2016) also focus on firms’ balance sheets, 
as they point out the increase in cash holdings among non-financial corporations in emerging 
markets. The papers argue that firms are not accumulating cash as a precautionary measure, but 
to engage in cross-border speculative activities; i.e., to take advantage of interest rate spreads 
between advanced and emerging economies. Hence, the traditional belief that cash increases a 
firm’s repaying ability may not hold in the current environment. 
There has been limited research on the drivers and consequences of high currency 
exposure due to the shortage of reliable data on currency composition of debt.7 However, the 
view most widely held is that foreign-currency liabilities are a concern for emerging market non-
financial corporations and particularly troubling for firms that do not have natural currency 
                                                 
7 The two major issues compiling accurate data on debt currency composition are: (a) Many corporate reports 
present the currency composition of their liabilities in the notes of the reports and not in hard data, and (b) the use of 
offshore intermediaries to borrow funds makes it difficult to establish the residence of the ultimate debt-holder – a 
problem documented in Shin and Zhao (2013) and Avdjiev et al. (2014), among others. 
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hedges in place (e.g. firms in non-tradable industries).8 Harvey and Roper (1999) show that high 
foreign currency-denominated leverage and low profitability were important factors spreading 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2015) corroborate the idea that foreign currency 
borrowing increases systemic risk and exposes lenders to the risk of default when the borrower’s 
currency plunges. 
There is substantial academic and policy research showing concern about the health of 
the non-financial sector in emerging markets. However, the literature so far has not been able to 
show whether a heightened risk of default is correlated with suggested indicators of corporate 
distress. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that estimates emerging market-
specific probabilities of corporate default and quantifies how the global macroeconomic 
environment they operate in can affect their ability to remain solvent. Additionally, having a 
reliable measure of corporate default risk allows us to explore the behavior of distressed stocks 
in emerging markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.3 explains the methodology. 
Section 1.4 describes the data. Section 1.5 presents the results of logit regressions of the 
probability of default and introduces global betas as predictors of default. Section 1.6 shows the 
asset pricing implications of our measure of distress risk. Section 1.7 concludes. 
1.3 Methodology 
Although leverage levels receive substantial attention in the corporate default literature, 
several studies show the importance of other accounting and market variables in forecasting 
corporate bankruptcies. Earlier static bankruptcy prediction models used accounting ratios to 
                                                 
8 Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2016) and others find that currency exposure is not as risky for companies with natural 
hedges. 
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forecast default (See Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984). Shumway (2001) points 
out that static models effectively require arbitrary choices about how long ahead of bankruptcy to 
observe the firms’ characteristics – adding selection bias to the process. In contrast, dynamic 
forecasting using hazard or dynamic logit models use all available information to determine each 
firm’s bankruptcy risk at each point in time. By including each firm-year as a separate 
observation, the data used for estimation is much larger and controls for the "period at risk," 
namely that some firms fail after being at risk for many years and others go from healthy to 
bankrupt much faster. In addition to accounting for duration dependence, hazard models include 
time-varying covariates, which provide a changing picture of a firm’s health. Campbell et al. 
(2008) build on the work of Shumway (2001) and improve the set of variables used to predict 
distress. The authors run a logit model on US data, putting more emphasis on market variables as 
predictors of distress. 
Similar to Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008), we estimate a model of 
probability of default using a logit specification augmented by domestic and global 
macroeconomic factors that have particular relevance to emerging market firms. We assume a 
logistic distribution for the marginal probability of default over the next period, which is given 
by: 
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1) =  
1
1+exp (−𝛼 −𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 )
     (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1 in the month t prior to firm i defaulting and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 0 in all periods when the firm 
does not default the following month. Firms disappear from the sample only after they 
experience a bankruptcy event. Firms that do not default at any point in the sample have 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 0 
throughout the entire period, including in the month of their departure if they leave the sample 
for reasons other than default (e.g. merger). The vector of explanatory variables, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1, is known 
11 
at the end of the previous period. A higher level of 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 implies a higher probability of 
default. 
We suggest that the domestic macroeconomic environment may affect the financial 
health of emerging market firms through demand for their goods and services, wage and 
borrowing costs, and other input costs. Evidence from the credit risk literature suggests that the 
incidence of firm failures rises during recessions (Pearce and Michael, 2006; Altman and Brady, 
2001) and that GDP growth and an indicator of recession improve the predictive power of credit 
risk models (Bangia et al., 2002; Richardson et al., 1998; Helwege and Kleiman, 1997). Further, 
inflation risk affects economic growth and uncertainty about the domestic economy. For 
example, Hernandez-Tinoco et al. (2013) find a significant relationship between default risk and 
both domestic inflation and interest rates in UK firms. To control for the impact of the domestic 
economic conditions in the probability of default of emerging market firms, we include a number 
of domestic macroeconomic indicators and country fixed effects in different specifications of the 
model. 
Furthermore, the globalization and increased interconnectedness of financial markets 
propagates the transmission of financial and economic conditions from developed to emerging 
markets. For instance, a 2015 report by the IMF shows that the increase in corporate debt in 
emerging markets was driven by global factors. Shin (2013) argues that global liquidity 
increased in response to the Global Financial Crisis, while Jotikasthira et al. (2012) report that 
"global funds substantially alter portfolio allocations in emerging markets in response to funding 
shocks from their investor base." Due to their high reliance on international markets for funding, 
the listed firms that make up our dataset are likely affected by these changes in global conditions. 
For this reason, we also include a number of global variables that may influence the distress risk 
12 
of emerging market firms. Section 1.5.2 Global Betas discusses in detail the methodology to 
compute global betas as a measure of emerging market risk exposure to a range of global factors. 
1.3.1 Model Performance 
The existing literature uses a number of measures of a model’s predictive power, most of 
which involve ranking firms by their estimated probability of default. However, studies differ in 
the number of firms and defaults, size of quantiles to group firms into, and allocation of 
distressed firms across quantiles, making comparisons across models difficult. Chava and Jarrow 
(2004) and Wu et al. (2010), among others, improve comparability by relying on the Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROC) score. The ROC score, also known as "area under the power" or 
"area under the curve" (AUC), uses the cumulative fraction of defaults as a function of the 
ordered population of firms from most to least likely to fail as predicted by the model. 
Figure 1.1 shows an example. Point A on the "Good Model" curve tells us that the 20% 
of firms that a particular model identifies as most likely to default include 70% of the firms that 
go on to default the next month. Point B in the "Bad Model" curve signals that it takes 50% of 
firms ordered from most to least likely to default for the model to identify 70% of defaulting 
companies. We compare the two models by computing the area under each of the curves (AUC). 
A larger area indicates that the model is correctly predicting more distressed firms as being likely 
to fail. An AUC of 0.5 indicates no discriminatory power, and the closer the score gets to 1 the 
better the model identifies distressed firms.9 Contributing to the interpretation of the AUC, 
Hanley and McNeil (1982) show that the score obtained by ranking observations by estimated 
likelihood of failure represents the probability that a failed subject will be ranked ahead of a 
randomly chosen healthy subject. 
                                                 
9 See Sobehart and Keenan (2001) for more details on the ROC score. 
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To measure goodness of fit, we use McFadden’s pseudo-𝑅2, which compares the model’s 
likelihood (𝐿) to that of a model consisting of only a constant (𝐿0); i.e., the average default rate 
in the sample. Specifically, it is computed as 1 −  
log (𝐿)
log (𝐿0)
 and can be interpreted in the same 
manner as the standard 𝑅2 (between 0 and 1, increasing in model fit). 
1.3.2 Variable Selection 
Given the large number of default predictors found by the literature and the lack of 
studies specific to emerging markets, we want to make sure we include only the most relevant set 
of explanatory variables in our specification. Hence, in a robustness exercise we add the Least 
Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) routine to our estimation. This procedure 
allows us to select, from a large set of explanatory variables, the subset with highest predictive 
power. The LASSO constrains the sum of the absolute value of the coefficients during the 
maximum likelihood estimation, forcing some coefficients to equal zero.10 Specifically, it 
minimizes the following (negative) likelihood function, which includes a constraint on the sum 
of the coefficients: 
∑ (−𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡) + log(1 + exp{−𝛼 − 𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1})) + 𝜆(∑ |𝛽𝑘|
𝑝
𝑘=1 )
𝑛
𝑖=1    (2) 
We use cross-validation to determine the level of 𝜆 that gives the best model fit. Next, we 
choose the set of variables within one standard error of the optimal 𝜆 that maximizes the in-
sample ROC. The result is enhanced prediction accuracy and ease of interpretation of the 
coefficients. Tian, Yu, and Guo (2015) employ this routine on US data, and their resulting set of 
accounting and market variables achieves higher in- and out-of-sample predictability than 
                                                 
10 The variables that enter the LASSO procedure are standardized in advance in order for LASSO to accurately 
compare the importance of each variable. Dummy variables are standardized as well, which prevents us from 
interpreting their LASSO coefficient in the usual manner – this is not problematic since we re-run our model using 
the set of variables selected by LASSO. 
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Campbell et al. (2008). Starting from theoretical arguments and existing advanced-economy 
specifications, the LASSO routine allows us to add statistical rigor to the variable-selection 
component of the exercise. 
1.4 Data 
Our dataset consists of corporate default events and a set of firm-specific and 
macroeconomic explanatory variables. A majority of the data come from the CRI database, the 
Credit Research Initiative of the National University of Singapore, accessed on December 1, 
2016. The CRI database contains detailed default, accounting, and market data for over 60,000 
exchange-listed firms in 119 countries between 1990 and 2016. The countries in our analysis are 
those classified as Emerging Markets by MSCI during the majority of our sample period (1995-
2016): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. 
The dataset is novel in its broad coverage of balance sheet variables and, especially, of 
default events in emerging markets.11 As Table 1.1 shows, the CRI database contains information 
on firms’ bankruptcies and other corporate default actions. This is important because countries 
differ in their definitions of default. To construct our measure of financial distress, we define a 
default to be any of the events in the "Bankruptcy Filing" (excluding "Petitions Withdrawn"), the 
"Delisting", and the "Default Corporate Action" (excluding "Buyback options") groups.12 
Delayed payments made within a grace period are not counted as defaults. 
                                                 
11 Market data from emerging markets on stock prices and related variables are fairly accessible from sources such 
as Datastream, Bloomberg, etc. 
12 The number of Default Corporate Action events is lower than the sum of its sub-components because some events 
include multiple concurrent actions (e.g. Missed Loan Payment and Missed Coupon Payment). 
15 
Table B1 in Appendix B shows our distress indicator over time for firms with sufficient 
data to replicate benchmark specifications from existing US studies. The first column shows the 
number of firm-months of data in each year, the second column the number of default events per 
year, and the third column the corresponding percentage of firms that experienced a default 
event. The average default rate in the sample is close to 0.1% per year, with some variation 
within years. Importantly, there is no strong clustering across time, as the distress indicator 
displays considerable cross-time variation in the distribution of corporate defaults. The two years 
with highest share of defaults coincide with the depth of the Asian Financial Crisis. Coverage of 
accounting variables varies. The number of firm-months and defaults with data for any of the 
variables in Campbell et al.’s (2008) specification is 2,724,716 and 2,150, respectively. 
However, in order to run the logit model, we require every observation have data for all 
explanatory variables included in the regression specification. Due to missing observations and 
the sparsity of some accounting data, the final sample includes 671,762 observations and 590 
default events. This data serves as the basis for our benchmark regression specification. 
As seen in Table B2 in Appendix B, the data coverage varies substantially by country, 
possibly influencing the lack of a clear pattern in the percentage of defaults by year. Comparing 
our sample against prior studies using US firms, we find that the ratio of defaults to firms is 
lower in emerging markets than in the United States. This could be due to a couple of reasons. 
First, governments own a percentage of many listed firms in emerging markets and might be 
more inclined to bail out or recapitalize struggling companies. Second, large firms may benefit 
from corruption in governments to get help staying solvent. 
The set of covariates consists of three types of variables: firm-specific accounting and 
market variables; domestic macroeconomic variables; and global variables, i.e. variables from 
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outside the emerging market region. Consistent with Campbell et. al. (2008), the monthly firm-
specific market variables are: log excess stock returns relative to the country’s main index 
(EXRET), log of price per share (PRICE), volatility of daily returns over the prior month (VOL), 
and the log ratio of market cap relative to the total market cap of all listed firms in the country 
(RELSIZE). The accounting variables have quarterly frequency and include the ratio of net 
income to the market value of total assets (NIMTA), the ratio of total liabilities to the market 
value of total assets (TLMTA), the ratio of cash and short-term assets to the market value of total 
assets (CASHMTA), and the market-to-book ratio (MB).13 In some of our specifications we 
include a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has experienced a default event in the 
past.14
 
To control for large outliers and possible errors in the balance sheet and market data, we 
winsorize the firm-specific variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile of their distributions 15. We 
also lag the accounting ratios (TLMTA, NIMTA, CASHMTA, and MB) by three months to 
ensure the balance sheet data was publicly available at the time we predict default. 
To capture the domestic macro environment in which firms operate, we incorporate four 
domestic macro variables for each country. The first is the unemployment rate to capture slack in 
the economy, retrieved from the World Bank. Inflation is the monthly change in CPI from the 
Bank for International settlements, which reflects pricing pressures in the local economy. Real 
                                                 
13 Campbell et al. (2008) include time-weighted averages of NIMTA over the previous four quarters and EXRET 
over the previous twelve months. Due to the sparsity of emerging market data, we would lose too many observations 
if we required one consecutive year of data for those two variables. We use the single-period definition instead. 
14 Although we would have liked to include a variable indicating the firm’s age or listing date, unfortunately good 
quality data are not available for the firms in our sample. 
15 Market-to-book ratio is winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles in order to deal with firm-months with very 
small or negative book-to-equity values, which in turn make MB very large. 
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interest rates come also from the World Bank, and we include them as a proxy for local 
borrowing costs and liquidity. Lastly, the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bonds Spread, which 
measures the average spread on US dollar-denominated bonds issued by sovereign entities over 
US Treasuries, incorporates international investors’ perception of the government’s credit risk. 
The set of global macro variables includes the monthly change in a country’s exchange 
rate against the US dollar, since it is a major determinant of firms’ revenues from abroad and 
their ability to repay debts denominated in dollars.16 We also include the monthly change in the 
sovereign spread measures the change in the country’s perceived credit quality compared to the 
United States, often driven by increases or decreases in capital flows to the emerging country’s 
financial markets. 
Moving on to variables computed only with developed-market data, the CBOE Volatility 
Index, known commonly as the VIX, measures the market’s expectation for 30-day volatility in 
the S&P 500. A higher VIX typically denotes a general increase in the risk premium and, 
consequently, an increase in borrowing costs of emerging market firms. Rey (2015) finds one 
global factor correlated with the VIX that drives the price of risky assets around the world, while 
Forbes and Warnock (2012) show that changes in the VIX explain international capital flows. 
The effect of changes in US rates on capital flows to emerging markets has also been established 
in the literature (Chari, Dilts and Lundblad, 2017), and Bruno and Shin (2015) introduce bank 
leverage as a mechanism through which changes in US monetary policy impact international 
capital flows. To address the interest rate effect, we include both the US federal funds rate and 
the 5-year US Treasury rate. The federal funds rate is indicative of monetary conditions and 
changes in monetary policy in the United States, whereas the 5-year Treasury rate serves as the 
                                                 
16 The percentage of corporate debt denominated in US dollars has increased dramatically since the Global Financial 
Crisis, as shown by IMF (2015) and others. 
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risk-free rate against which investors in advanced economies evaluate the payoffs of all other 
assets of similar maturities. Lastly, the TED spread is a proxy for perceived credit risk in the US 
economy, and it is computed by subtracting the 3-month Treasury bill rate from the 3-month 
LIBOR rate. Due to the correlation between TED spread and VIX, we use the orthogonal 
component of the two, i.e. the residual of a regression of the TED spread on VIX, similar to 
Fratzscher (2012). 
The global variables have monthly frequency and are common to all firms in the 
sample.17 Appendix A defines variables and their sources in greater detail. 
1.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1.2 reports simple equally-weighted means of the explanatory variables, as well as 
t-tests for means. The first column presents means for the full sample, the second column for the 
Default group, and the third for the Bankrupt group – a subset of the Default group. The fourth 
and fifth columns show whether there is a statistically significant difference in means between 
the full sample and the Default and Bankrupt groups, respectively. 
The firm-specific covariates show that firms in the Default group exhibit lower excess 
returns, stock prices, and volatility. Firms under duress are also smaller, the average firm in the 
group comprising 0.01% of the country’s market cap, compared to over 0.04% for the average 
firm in the full sample. 
Looking at firm balance sheets, firms one month away from default differ from the full 
sample in the expected direction – and the difference in all four mean accounting ratios is larger 
for firms in the Bankrupt group. Distressed firms have lower profitability and are on average 
making losses the month before failing to pay their obligations, compared to an average net 
                                                 
17 Except the bilateral exchange rate (local/USD) and changes in the sovereign spread, which we include as global 
factors because they are most important for firms with exposure to the rest of the world. 
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income to total assets of 0.004 in the full sample. These firms also have higher leverage (0.578 
and 0.759 for Default and Bankrupt groups, respectively) than the overall population (0.366), as 
well as lower cash holdings over total assets: 0.045 and 0.024 for the Default and Bankrupt 
groups, compared to a full sample average of 0.082. Both ratios are suggestive of firms’ 
diminishing ability to repay their upcoming liabilities. Lastly, troubled firms have low book 
value of equity relative to their market capitalization, resulting in higher market-to-book ratios of 
2.673 (Default) and 4.400 (Bankrupt), compared to 2.121 for the full sample. All summary 
statistics described so far are consistent with those in Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. 
(2008), except for the fact that volatility of stock returns is lower for firms one month away from 
default. 
We also introduce a variable that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been used in the 
literature: an indicator of whether a firm has defaulted in the past. Comparing the means of 
distressed firms and the full sample, we find in the Default and Bankrupt groups a much higher 
percentage of firms which have already suffered a default event. 
The interpretation of the differences in the means of the domestic macroeconomic 
variables is less clear, given that some countries will have structurally higher levels of interest 
rates, inflation, unemployment or sovereign spreads than others throughout the sample. In any 
case, we find that domestic macroeconomic environment for the Default group is characterized 
by lower unemployment and real interest rates. 
On the other hand, the direction of the effect of global variables on corporate distress is 
intuitive based on how they affect firms’ ability to roll over or pay off their financial obligations 
to avoid default. We would expect an environment of high interest rates in the US to lower the 
search for yield and corresponding demand for riskier emerging market debt instruments. The 
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summary statistics support this hypothesis, with firms defaulting in times of higher 5-year 
Treasury and Fed Funds rates: 2.890% and 1.869%, respectively, compared to 2.363% and 
1.235% in the full sample. Also as expected, defaults occur on average during times when a 
country’s sovereign spread is increasing more than on average during our sample period. Lastly, 
the Default group is characterized by having a higher TED spread; that is, higher global liquidity 
risk. VIX levels and exchange rate dynamics are not significantly different between distressed 
firms and the full sample. 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 A General Model of Default Risk 
As a first step to tailoring the default risk model to emerging market firms, we run a 
variable selection exercise using the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) 
to choose from a set of accounting and market variables the combination with highest predictive 
power for emerging markets.18 While Campbell et al. (2008) (referred to as CHS intermittently 
hereafter) show their model outperforms other prior specifications in the US-based literature, we 
do not assume the same combination of firm-specific variables will achieve the highest 
prediction power for emerging market firms. Therefore, we construct nine other accounting 
ratios that show some explanatory power in the existing literature, and we add them to the eight 
accounting and market variables in CHS. The results of the LASSO procedure do not show 
strong evidence that any subset of accounting and market variables specific to emerging markets 
outperforms those used by CHS. We therefore use the CHS specification with accounting and 
market variables as a baseline and examine whether including domestic and global macro 
variables enhances model performance. 
                                                 
18 Methodology section provides details. 
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Before moving on to our general model of default risk, we address multicollinearity 
concerns associated with our multivariate framework. Table B3 in Appendix B shows the 
correlation matrix of the variables in our model and, in the last two rows, two popular measures 
of multicollinearity, the Tolerance value (TOL) and its reciprocal Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF), for each of the regressors. VIF is computed as 1/(1 − 𝑅𝑘
2), where 𝑅𝑘
2 is the 𝑅2 value of a 
regression of factor 𝑘 on all others. TOL is simply 1 − 𝑅𝑘
2. VIF values larger than 10 are 
typically considered suggestive of multicollinearity in a model. In our specification, no variable 
has VIF > 10, and only the Fed Funds Rate and 5-year Treasury rate have VIF > 5, presumably 
due to the high correlation between the two. The correlation between Fed Funds Rate and 5-year 
Treasury rates is 0.888, the only pairwise correlation larger than 0.6 in absolute value among all 
our variables 
In order to estimate the model with country fixed effects we must drop any country with 
no defaults during the period being used for estimation. The effect on our sample is small: the 
sample size only falls from 671,762 to 589,224 firm-months, and we are left with firms from 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, South Korea, 
and Thailand. 
Table 1.3 shows the results of six iterations of the multivariate logistic regression. As a 
benchmark, we estimate in Column 1 the CHS model, which yields a pseudo-𝑅2 of 0.124 and an 
AUC of 0.865. All coefficients are significant and have the same sign Campbell et al. (2008) 
find, except for volatility of returns (opposite sign) and market capitalization (not significant). 
The results imply that a firm is more likely to default next month if it has lower excess stock 
returns, a lower stock price, lower volatility of returns, lower profitability, higher leverage, less 
cash, and a higher market-to-book ratio. 
22 
Next, we add a dummy variable signaling whether a firm has defaulted in the past, and 
we find that it greatly increases explained variation and predictive power (Column 2). The 
pseudo-𝑅2 goes up to 0.2 and the AUC to 0.907. We keep the prior default event dummy in the 
set of firm-specific variables moving forward. To the best of our knowledge ours is the first 
paper to include this explanatory variable that is remarkably robust across specifications. 
Including a wider subset of events as "Default" rather than outright bankruptcy, allows us to 
examine the impact of prior distress states on the current probability of default. 
In the third column we add the domestic macro variables – unemployment, inflation, real 
interest rates, and sovereign spreads – to the regression. The pseudo-𝑅2 increases to 0.235, but 
the AUC falls to 0.888, suggesting a better model fit but not better predictive power. We find 
that default is associated with higher unemployment, lower real interest rates, and lower 
sovereign spreads, after controlling for firm-specific accounting and market variables. The 
inclusion of the domestic macro environment makes firm size negatively correlated with the 
probability of default. 
Column 4 presents the results of a model that consists of CHS, the prior default dummy, 
and global variables. The higher AUC than in Column 3 suggests that global variables contribute 
more predictive power than domestic variables after controlling for firm-specific covariates. The 
coefficients suggest that default risk is associated with higher 5-year Treasury rates, lower Fed 
Funds rates – likely an adjustment for the 5-year rates, since Fed Fund rates are unconditionally 
positively correlated with default – and a higher TED spread. In other words, after controlling for 
firm-specific accounting and market variables, emerging market firms are more likely to default 
when US 5-year rates are high, Fed Funds rates are low, and credit risk in the US is more 
prevalent. 
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A specification that includes both domestic and global variables is presented in Column 
5. Notable results are the significantly positive coefficient on VIX and the fact that real interest 
rates are the only domestic macro variable to remain (negatively) associated with default risk. 
Before introducing country fixed effects, we again rely on LASSO to verify that no 
subset of variables would deliver a model with better fit. Figure C1 shows the path of the 
coefficients during the LASSO estimation, with decreasing l (from left to right) loosening the 
constraint on the absolute value of the standardized coefficients and allowing more variables to 
enter the regression. The coefficients the procedure returns for the l that yields the best fit are 
shown in Column 2 of Table C1. LASSO eliminates all global variables but the 5-year Treasury 
rate, as well as volatility of returns, firm size, and cash. When we run a logit regression using the 
explanatory variables selected by LASSO (Column 3), the sign and significance levels of the 
coefficients match those of our benchmark model (Column 1). The AUC of the LASSO model is 
only marginally larger than that of the full model, suggesting that the entire set of explanatory 
variables is almost as good at explaining and predicting default as the best subset as selected by 
LASSO. 
Finally, a specification that includes country fixed effects yields the best predictive 
power, with an AUC of 0.914. Including country fixed effects allows us to control for country-
specific differences in characteristics like legal system, bankruptcy laws, and state intervention, 
all of which are difficult to quantify. The ROC curve associated with this and CHS’s model is 
shown in Figure 1.2. Figure 1.3 plots, for each quarter, the number of defaults predicted by this 
model against the number of actual defaults. As in the CHS benchmark, we find that a firm is 
more likely to default next month if it has low excess returns, price, profitability, and cash; as 
well as high leverage and market-to-book ratio. Adding country fixed effects causes relative size 
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(a firm’s market cap divided by the total market cap of all listed firms in the country) to be 
positively correlated with the probability of default. While the corporate default literature finds 
the opposite relationship for firms in advanced economies (e.g. Campbell et al., 2008; 
Hernandez-Tinoco et al., 2013), Alfaro et al. (2017) find that firm size is positively correlated 
with corporate fragility, measured by Altman’s Z-score. Volatility of returns is no longer 
significant, and VIX becomes statistically significant and positively correlated with default, at 
the expense of the TED spread, which loses its significance. 
Being the specification with highest predictive power, we use Column 6 as our measure 
of probability of default in the remainder of the paper. We test the robustness of our estimates by 
running two out-of-sample tests of predictive power. First, we estimate the probability of default 
model one time using data from the earliest 70% of our sample and use the estimates to compute 
the AUC for each month in the remaining 30% of the sample. Second, we estimate the model in 
a recursive manner (increasing the estimation window every month, starting with the earliest 
60% of data) and predict default on the following month. Both methods yield an AUC of 0.88, 
compared to an in-sample AUC of 0.914. 
Lastly, we compute average marginal effects of each individual regressor, presented in 
Table 1.5. This allows us to speak about the economic significance of the coefficients; i.e., the 
effect on the probability of default of changes in a specific predictor variable while keeping all 
other predictors constant. We find that Leverage and Cash have the largest average marginal 
effects, such that a one-standard-deviation increase in the predictor is associated with 0.4 and -
0.52 percentage point changes in the probability of default, respectively. From the set of global 
variables, DFX and 5-year Treasury Rate have the largest average marginal effects. Figures 1.4-
1.7 show the vectors of predicted probabilities for the entire range of each explanatory variable 
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in our model, while keeping all the other predictors constant at their means. The plots reveal the 
curvature in variables like size, leverage, and profitability, and they allow us to compare the 
probability of default at various levels of each variable for the average firm. 
1.5.2 Global Betas 
Not captured by the global variables in the logistic regression is the fact that some 
emerging market firms are more dependent on or exposed to global markets than others. When 
we include global variables in our baseline model of probability of default, the average effect of 
these factors on our entire sample might hide stronger coefficients and predictive power for the 
more global-facing firms. However, if stock returns accurately carry information about the 
impact of global factors on firms, we may expect the default risk of corporations with returns 
more sensitive to global factors to be more correlated with such variables. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we compute firm-specific betas of stock returns to each of 
the global factors in our model. Specifically, we run a time series regression for each firm and 
global factor, conditional on having at least two years of data on returns and the global variable. 
The dependent variable is the firm’s stock returns, and the explanatory variables are the global 
factor and the returns of the country’s main stock index. The resulting coefficient on each global 
factor is what we take to represent the sensitivity of the firm’s returns to the global factor, after 
controlling for the country’s returns. Having computed betas for each of the global factors, we 
select the tercile of firms with most negative betas, i.e. whose returns fall most with increases in 
the global factor.19 Once our firms are sorted by betas, we create a dummy variable that indicates 
whether a firm belongs to the top tercile. 
                                                 
19 In the case of the change in the exchange rate, we choose the tercile of firms with most positive betas; that is, 
whose returns fall most with increases in the rate of change of the US dollar relative to the local currency. 
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Panel A in Table 1.4 reports the results of logit regressions of probability of default 
where the explanatory variables are the global variable and the interaction of that global variable 
with the top-tercile beta dummy. The coefficient on the interaction term tells us whether the 
magnitude of the impact of each global factor on the probability of default differs for the subset 
of firms with most sensitive returns to that factor. We find positive, statistically significant 
coefficients in the top-third dummy interactions for 5-year Treasury rates, VIX, and Fed funds 
rate. This implies that the harmful effect on the probability of default of increases in these 
variables is larger for the stocks which fall most during increases in those variables. For instance, 
the risk of default increases more with VIX for firms with most negative VIX betas. Panel B 
shows that the difference in effect between firms with more or less sensitive returns is not due to 
different firm characteristics between the two groups. 
Combining all global variables into one global factor yields further evidence that the 
sensitivity of returns to global financial conditions is related to the effect those global conditions 
have on firms’ probability of default. We construct an index of return sensitivity to the global 
environment – which we call the Global Beta Z score – by combining the betas of the six global 
variables in our model. We standardize the beta for each global factor by subtracting the mean 
beta across firms and dividing by the standard deviation. We then add the resulting values of the 
six factors.20 The result is a combined measure that gives equal weight to each beta and serves as 
proxy for how much a firm’s returns respond to global financial conditions. A lower Global Beta 
Z score implies that a firm’s returns are more negatively affected by increases in the global 
variables. We compute a Global Variable Z in the same manner, using the global variables as 
inputs instead of the betas. A higher Global Variable Z score is associated with a more difficult 
                                                 
20 We subtract the change in the exchange rate since we want an increase in the US dollar to impact the Global Beta 
Z score in the same direction as an increase in rates, VIX, sovereign spread, and TED spread. 
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environment for emerging markets to finance themselves (what is often known as a "risk-off" 
environment). 
In Table 1.6 we show the results of a logit regression of the probability of default on 
Global Beta Z, Global Variable Z, and the interaction of the two. We control for firm-specific 
and domestic macro variables. The coefficient on Global Beta Z is not statistically significant, 
implying that exposure to global financial conditions per se is not a predictor of default. On the 
other hand, Global Variable Z is positively correlated with default risk; i.e. a firm is more likely 
to default in global risk-off conditions. Additionally, the interaction of the two returns a 
significant, negative coefficient. This tells us that the effect of a risk-off environment on default 
risk is larger for firms whose returns respond more negatively to such global conditions, all else 
equal.21
  
We can therefore conclude that, for some global factors like 5-year Treasury rates and for 
a composite global factor, how sensitive a firm’s returns are to the factor(s) affects how much its 
solvency depends on the level of such factor(s). There are at least two possible explanations 
behind this connection between default risk and market betas. First, the stock market captures the 
effect of global conditions on the firms’ probability of default, and the price responds more 
sharply than for other firms. Second, the fact that returns respond more strongly to the global 
environment increases the firm’s probability of default. In other words, the larger response of 
returns in some firms accentuates the direct impact of the global conditions on the firm’s ability 
to remain solvent. Should the first explanation hold, it would suggest a distress risk premium 
exists in emerging market stock returns. We explore this and other asset pricing implications of 
our measure of probability of default in the next section. 
                                                 
21 It is worth noting that the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant when computing the global betas 
using local currency returns rather than US-dollar returns. 
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1.6 Asset Pricing 
We use our estimated probability of default (Column 6 in Table 1.3) to study the stock 
returns of distressed firms in emerging markets. As was the case with the distress risk measure, 
research on the distress risk premium has been mostly focused on US equities (e.g. Fama and 
French, 1996; Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Da and Gao, 2010; Campbell et al., 2008). Asset pricing 
theory suggests investors should demand a premium for holding stocks at risk of default. 
However, Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008), among others, find the 
opposite: stocks of firms with a high probability of default yield lower returns than their safer or 
more solvent counterparts. Campbell et al. (2008) show this result holds even after controlling 
for Fama-French factors and a momentum factor. The findings have important implications for 
the understanding of risk factors in asset prices, since distress risk is often argued to be the 
reason behind the small cap and value premia (Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1996). 
We test whether the distress risk premium puzzle exists also in emerging market stocks. 
Every month between January 2002 and December 2015 we estimate our measure of next-month 
probability of default using all prior data in the sample to prevent look-ahead bias. In the first 
month, we sort all stocks based on this predicted probability of default and construct ten 
portfolios of equal size, placing the stocks with lowest distress risk in Portfolio 1 and those most 
likely to default in Portfolio. 
We rebalance the portfolios every month thereafter based on the stocks’ updated distress 
risk, again placing the least and most likely to default in Portfolios 1 and 10, respectively. As a 
proxy for expected returns, we use average realized returns over the 12 months after distress risk 
is computed. Next-month realized returns leave little room for information surprises to cancel 
out, and, by looking at returns over a longer horizon, we average out temporary over- and under-
performance due to idiosyncratic events unrelated to firm health. 
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Table 1.7 shows each portfolio’s average estimated probability of default and 12-month 
average monthly returns. The spread in the probability of default across portfolios is large: the 
average firm in the portfolio with lowest default risk has just a 0.005% probability of failing next 
month, compared to 1.17% for the average firm in the riskiest decile. The average 12-month 
returns reported in the second row are monotonically increasing in probability of default, 
consistent with a positive risk premium associated with distress. The safest and riskiest portfolios 
return 0.5% and 1.4% per month, respectively. However, these results don’t necessarily imply 
the existence of a distress risk premium in emerging market stocks, since our measure of distress 
risk may be associated with other factors that demand premia of their own. To address this, we 
control for six common factors from the literature in order to separate the distress risk premium 
from other sources of risk premia that may be present in our sample. These are the three factors 
from Fama and French (1993), momentum, short-term reversal, and long-term reversal. 
Appendix A describes the computation of these factors in detail. 
We find that high failure risk portfolios have higher betas on SMB, HML, and RM. These 
coefficients imply that the larger returns of riskier portfolios can be partly explained by Fama 
and French’s three factors; correcting for them reduces the outperformance of distressed stocks 
that can be attributed to distress risk. The constant, or alpha, of this regression can be interpreted 
as the portion of returns not explained by the factors. We observe alphas that are increasing in 
default risk. This allows us to conclude that, even after correcting for the sources of risk captured 
by the factors, investors can expect a higher return on portfolios comprised of stocks at high risk 
of default. Figures 1.8 and 1.9 graphically depict the returns, alphas, and factor loadings from the 
6-factor regression. Figure 1.10 plots the 6-factor alphas and their 95% confidence intervals, 
which show that the alpha on Portfolio 10 (highest probability of default) is significantly larger 
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than the alphas on Portfolios 5 and lower, and the alpha on Portfolio 1 (lowest probability of 
default) is significantly smaller than all other portfolios’ alphas. 
We run a number of different exercises in order to test the statistical significance of these 
results. First, we form two "long-short" portfolios, LS90-10 and LS80-20 – the first long the 
most distressed portfolio (Portfolio 10) and short the portfolio with least distressed stocks 
(Portfolio 1), and the second long the two most distressed portfolios and short the two with least 
distressed stocks. We run a 6-factor regression using the 12-month average return of LS90-10 
and LS80-20, and the results are shown in Table 1.8. The positive, statistically significant alphas 
confirm that the factor-adjusted compensation is in fact larger for the portfolios with higher 
distress risk. 
An alternative method to compute 6-factor alphas using returns over a 12-month period is 
to run, for every month of the year following portfolio formation, a regression of that month’s 
returns on the six factors computed in that same month. By doing this, the timing of the returns 
corresponds with the timing of the factors, instead of using the factors computed only on the 
month following portfolio formation as controls for the average 12-month returns. The two main 
results described above – the monotonically increasing alphas in distress risk and the positive, 
statistically significant alphas on the long-short portfolios – also hold when running the factor 
regressions in this manner. 
To further test of the robustness of our findings, we run firm-level Fama Macbeth 
regressions of 12-month average returns on firms’ probability of default. We find a positive, 
statistically significant coefficient in the second stage cross-sectional regression, also confirming 
the presence of a distress risk premium in emerging market stocks. 
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Lastly, we use valuation ratios instead of realized returns to extract the distress risk 
premium. While realized returns are unbiased estimates of expected returns, their use as proxies 
for expected returns in the short and medium term has been questioned in the literature (e.g. 
Elton, 1999; Lundblad, 2007). Valuation measures like implied cost of capital, dividend yield, 
and earnings-to-price ratio are commonly suggested alternatives (e.g. Pastor et al, 2008), on the 
basis that they are a better reflection of investors’ expectations of future stock performance. We 
don’t have enough data to compute dividend yield or implied cost of capital; however, in early 
testing we don’t find much of a relationship between the net income-to-price ratio and our 
measure of probability of default. 
1.7 Conclusion 
There is a dearth of rigorous research on the determinants of corporate distress in 
emerging markets. The goal of this paper is to shed light on factors that adversely impact the 
solvency of emerging market firms and explore whether investors are compensated for taking on 
distress risk. We believe that developing a framework that allows policymakers to anticipate 
corporate defaults in emerging markets may inform efforts to mitigate their regional and global 
impact. 
We argue that, while existing models proposed for US firms yield reasonable forecasting 
power, they do not account for vulnerabilities specific to emerging market companies, such as 
advanced economy monetary policy changes, US dollar movements, or shifts in global liquidity 
and risk aversion. A novel multi-country dataset of corporate defaults allows us to develop a 
model of distress risk specific to emerging markets, as well as quantify the importance of global 
shocks on emerging market corporate distress. 
We find that, controlling for firm-specific variables and country fixed effects, the 5-year 
US Treasury rate, the Fed funds rate, and the VIX are correlated with distress risk. Furthermore, 
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introducing a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has defaulted in the past has a very 
positive impact on the model’s predictive power. To the best of our knowledge this is a novel 
result. A model that includes accounting, market, and global macro variables along with country 
fixed effects and the prior-default dummy yields a much higher explanatory power for emerging 
market firms than Campbell et al.’s (2008) specification. 
We also explore whether information about default risk is embedded in stock returns. We 
first do so by focusing on firms whose returns are most sensitive to global financial conditions. 
Analysis of these global betas reveals that the effect of the global variable on the probability of 
default is larger for firms with most negative betas. Furthermore, a composite global beta 
measure we call the Global Beta Z helps us show that the effect of a global risk-off environment 
on distress risk is greater for firms whose returns respond more negatively to such global 
conditions. 
Finally, we explore the asset pricing implications of our probability of default measure. 
Previous studies using reduced-form measures of default risk have struggled to identify a 
positive distress risk premium in US equities. We, on the other hand, find strong evidence of the 
presence of a distress risk premium in emerging market stocks. Future 12-month stock returns 
are monotonically increasing in the probability of corporate default, a trend that holds true after 
controlling for six popular factors. A number of robustness tests confirm the statistical 
significance of our findings. 
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1.8 Tables and Figures 
 
Point A in the "good model" ROC curve shows that the 20% of firms with highest probability of default include 
70% of the firms that default the following month. Point B in the "bad model" curve indicates that to capture 70% of 
firms that default next month one needs to include the top 50% firms with highest probability of default. 
Figure 1.1: Example of Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve 
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This figure shows the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve for our best model of distress risk and for the 
specification in Campbell et al. (2008). The curves shown are the average of the ROC curves in each month in the 
sample. 
Figure 1.2: In-sample Predictive Power 
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Table 1.1: Types of Default Events 
PANEL A 
Action Type Subcategory 
Bankruptcy Filing Administration, Arrangement, Canadian CCAA, Chapter 7, Chapter 
11, Chapter 15, Conservatorship, Insolvency, Japanese CRL, Judicial 
Management, Liquidation, Pre-Negotiation Chapter 11, Protection, 
Receivership, Rehabilitation, Rehabilitation (Thailand 1997), 
Reorganization, Restructuring, Section 304, Supreme court declaration, 
Winding up, Work out, Sued by creditor, Petition Withdrawn, Other 
Delisting Bankruptcy 
Default Corporate Action Bankruptcy, Coupon & Principal Payment, Coupon Payment Only, 
Debt Restructuring, Interest Payment, Loan Payment, Principal 
Payment, ADR (Japan only), Declared Sick (India only), Regulatory 
Action (Taiwan only), Financial Difficulty and Shutdown (Taiwan 
only), Buyback option, Other   
PANEL B 
Action Type Count 
Bankruptcy 74 
Delisting 3 
Default Corporate Action 509 
Bankruptcy Corporate Action 11 
Coupon & Principal Payment 19 
Coupon Payment 19 
Restructuring 133 
Interest Payment 10 
Loan Payment 320 
Principal Payment 10 
Other 2 
Unknown 12     
Panel A presents the types of default events covered in the CRI database and their classification into Bankruptcy, 
Delisting, and Corporate Default Action categories, as CRI does in its database’s technical report (NUS-RMI 
Technical Report 2016, Table A.9, p. 106). Panel B counts the number of each type of event in our final sample; i.e. 
the sample of firm-months with data on each of CHS’s variables. 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
  Means  t-Tests 
 Full Sample Default Bankrupt Default Bankrupt 
Excess returns -0.008 -0.050 -0.06 *** *** 
Stock price 2.636 1.305 0.156 *** *** 
Volatility of returns 1.580 0.714 0.727 **  
Market capitalization -7.735 -9.130 -9.233 *** *** 
Profitability 0.004 -0.017 -0.049 *** *** 
Leverage 0.366 0.578 0.759 *** *** 
Cash 0.082 0.045 0.024 *** *** 
Market-to-book ratio 2.121 2.673 4.400 *** *** 
Prior default 0.058 0.609 0.429 *** *** 
      
Unemployment rate 4.683 4.306 5.471 *** ** 
Inflation 0.036 0.035 0.031   
Real interest rate 4.123 1.929 8.113 *** *** 
Sovereign spread 2.541 2.503 1.965  * 
      
ΔSovereign spread 0.009 0.022 -0.003 **  
ΔFX 0 0 -0.003   
5-year Treasury 2.363 2.890 2.785 *** ** 
VIX 19.52 19.59 21.31  * 
Fed funds rate 1.235 1.869 1.547 ***  
TED spread -0.067 0.035 -0.111 ***  
      
Summary statistics for all firm-months, for the group of firm-months that experience any default event, and for the 
group that experiences a bankruptcy next month. The last two columns show the results of a two-sample t-test for 
equal means, where the "Default" and "Bankrupt" columns refer to the tests of whether the mean for the full sample 
is different from the default group or the bankrupt group, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.3: Logit Regressions of Probability of Default Next Month 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -7.470*** -8.108*** -8.297*** -9.360*** -9.478*** -9.973*** 
Excess returns -1.354*** -1.493*** -1.309*** -1.195*** -1.222*** -1.344*** 
Stock price -0.224*** -0.168*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.054** -0.193*** 
Volatility of returns -0.074** -0.071** -0.058* -0.077** -0.065* -0.022 
Market capitalization 0.027 -0.002 -0.045* -0.063*** -0.082*** 0.164*** 
Profitability -6.543*** -5.997*** -6.416*** -6.330*** -6.570*** -7.141*** 
Leverage 2.583*** 2.102*** 2.197*** 1.904*** 2.041*** 3.136*** 
Cash -4.837*** -3.235*** -4.195*** -3.451*** -3.717*** -5.993*** 
Market-to-book ratio 0.206*** 0.119*** 0.089*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.051*** 
Prior default  2.502*** 2.491*** 2.560*** 2.515*** 2.234** 
       
Unemployment rate   0.054**  0.032  
Inflation   -3.488  -2.587  
Real interest rate   -0.048***  -0.038***  
Sovereign spread   -0.037**  -0.018  
       
ΔSovereign spread    0.193 0.093 0.127 
ΔFX    1.194 -1.129 0.878 
5-year Treasury    0.351*** 0.320*** 0.349*** 
VIX    0.007 0.009* 0.015*** 
Fed funds rate    -0.119** -0.110* -0.109* 
TED spread    0.270** 0.218* 0.088 
       
Pseudo-𝑅2  0.124 0.200 0.235 0.232 0.241 0.221 
AUC 0.865 0.907 0.888 0.899 0.893 0.914 
Observations 589,224 589,224 372,673 402,253 372,158 402,253 
Defaults 589 589 524 544 522 544 
Country FE      X 
 
Results of logit regression combining CHS’s accounting and market variables with local and global macro variables 
to explain the probability of default next month. Column 1 replicates Campbell et al.’s (2008) specification, which 
uses only firm-specific accounting and market variables. Column 2 adds a dummy indicating whether a firm has 
experienced a default event in the past. Column 3 adds domestic macro variables, Column 4 includes global 
variables, and Column 5 has both domestic and global. Column 6 is our baseline specification, which incorporates 
country fixed effects to the model in Column 4. The dependent variable in all specifications is binary, indicating 
whether a firm experienced a distress event the following month. Pseudo-𝑅2 refers to McFadden’s Pseudo-𝑅2, and 
AUC is the area under the ROC curve. ***, **, and * indicate three levels of statistical significance of the 
coefficients: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. 
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This figure shows the number of actual defaults per month (averaged by quarter) and number of defaults predicted 
by our model. The number of predicted defaults in a month is the sum of the estimated probabilities of default of all 
firms. 
Figure 1.3: Time Series of Actual and Predicted Defaults 
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Table 1.4: Top Tercile Betas by Global Variable 
 
  PANEL A    
 ΔSov. spread ΔFX 5-year Treasury VIX Fed funds TED spread 
Constant -6.662*** -7.020*** -7.708*** -7.136*** -7.229*** -7.015*** 
Global variable 0.469 -0.378 0.245*** -0.002 0.129*** 0.244** 
Global variable * Top-tercile 0.376 1.063 0.082*** 0.020*** 0.060** 0.210 
Pseudo-R2 0.003 0 0.01 0.003 0.006 0.001 
Observations 479,438 774,705 774,705 774,705 774,705 774,705 
Defaults 617 692 692 692 692 692 
  PANEL B    
 ΔSov. spread ΔFX 5-year Treasury VIX Fed funds TED spread 
Constant -7.417 -7.447*** -8.363*** -7.529*** -7.824*** -7.503*** 
Excess returns -1.094*** -1.317*** -1.295*** -1.334*** -1.304*** -1.264*** 
Stock price -0.160*** -0.224*** -0.198*** -0.222*** -0.207*** -0.219*** 
Volatility of returns -0.100*** -0.083** -0.088*** -0.078** -0.088** -0.084*** 
Market capitalization 0.009 0.027 -0.016 0.024 0.003 0.021 
Profitability -7.019*** -6.539*** -6.631*** -6.489*** -6.661*** -6.660*** 
Leverage 2.416*** 2.559*** 2.473*** 2.651*** 2.501*** 2.560*** 
Cash -5.725*** -4.966*** -4.751*** -5.191*** -4.796*** -4.941*** 
Market-to-book ratio 0.184*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.200*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 
Global variable 0.612* 1.434 0.182*** -0.009* 0.092*** 0.381*** 
Global variable * Top-tercile -0.201 0.890 0.075*** 0.026*** 0.059* -0.013 
Pseudo-𝑅2  0.102 0.123 0.129 0.128 0.126 0.125 
Observations 398,601 586,985 586,985 586,985 586,985 586,985 
Defaults 536 586 586 586 586 586 
Results of logit regression of probability of default on each global factor, controlling for firm-specific variables. The 
explanatory variables in Panel A are the global variable of the same name as each column and the interaction of that 
variable with a dummy indicating whether a firm’s returns are among the top-third most sensitive to the global 
factor. Panel B also includes CHS’s accounting and market variables as controls. The dependent variable is binary, 
indicating whether a firm experienced a distress event the following month. Pseudo-𝑅2 refers to McFadden’s 
Pseudo-𝑅2. ***, **, and * indicate three levels of statistical significance of the coefficients: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and 
p < 0.10, respectively. 
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Table 1.5: Marginal Effects 
 MEM AME 
Cash -0.111 -0.403 
Profitability -0.067 -0.242 
Excess returns -0.056 -0.204 
Stock price -0.009 -0.032 
Fed funds rate -0.003 -0.009 
Volatility of returns -0.001 -0.003 
VIX 0.001 0.002 
ΔSovereign spread 0.001 0.002 
TED spread 0.002 0.006 
Market-to-book ratio 0.003 0.013 
Market capitalization 0.005 0.019 
5-year Treasury 0.010 0.038 
ΔFX 0.037 0.132 
Prior default 0.084 0.304 
Leverage 0.125 0.450     
This table reports marginal effects of each individual regressor in the logit model, sorted from smallest to largest. 
The AME column shows average marginal effects. The MEM column presents marginal effects at the mean; i.e. the 
marginal effect of each regressor when all other regressors are kept at their mean. 
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This figure shows predicted probabilities for all values of each variable, keeping all other predictors constant at their 
mean. 
Figure 1.4: Predicted Probabilities I 
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This figure shows predicted probabilities for all values of each variable, keeping all other predictors constant at their 
mean. 
Figure 1.5: Predicted Probabilities II 
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This figure shows predicted probabilities for all values of each variable, keeping all other predictors constant at their 
mean. 
Figure 1.6: Predicted Probabilities III 
  
44 
 
 
This figure shows predicted probabilities for all values of each variable, keeping all other predictors constant at their 
mean. 
Figure 1.7: Predicted Probabilities IV 
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For each portfolio ordered from least to most distressed, this figure shows 12-month average future returns and 
alphas from the 6-factor regression on market, size, value, momentum, short-term reversal, and long-term reversal 
factors. 
Figure 1.8: Portfolio Returns and Alphas 
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Table 1.6: Composite Global Beta Z Score as Predictor of Default 
 (1) 
Constant -8.386*** 
Excess returns -1.187*** 
Stock price -0.063** 
Volatility of returns -0.066* 
Market capitalization -0.068*** 
Profitability -6.515*** 
Leverage 2.113*** 
Cash -3.947*** 
Market-to-book ratio 0.082*** 
Prior default 2.567***   
Unemployment rate 0.034† 
Inflation -4.259* 
Real interest rate -0.041*** 
Sovereign spread -0.027   
Beta Z -0.013 
Variable Z 0.073*** 
Beta Z * Variable Z -0.011† 
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.202 
AUC 0.893 
Observations 386,884 
Defaults 515 
    
Results of logit regression of probability of default on a composite global factor, controlling for firm-specific 
variables. Beta Z and Variable Z are the sum of the standardized global betas and global variables, respectively. We 
control for the CHS variables and the domestic macro variables. The dependent variable is binary, indicating 
whether a firm experienced a distress event the following month. Pseudo-R^2 refers to McFadden’s Pseudo-R^2. 
***, **, *, and † indicate three levels of statistical significance of the coefficients: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10, and p 
< 0.15, respectively. 
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Table 1.7: Returns on Portfolios Sorted by Distress Risk 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean P(default) (%) 0.005 0.010 0.016 0.025 0.038 0.058 0.079 0.110 0.171 1.169 
Mean 12-month returns 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 
6-factor alpha 0.0014 0.0040 0.0050 0.0053 0.0075 0.0093 0.0109 0.0117 0.0121 0.0125 
RM 0.0045 0.0137 0.0210 0.0317 0.0141 0.0381 0.0491 0.0490 0.0401 0.0546 
SMB 0.1166 0.1147 0.1271 0.174 0.1677 0.2458 0.2564 0.3188 0.3092 0.3930 
HML 0.1885 0.1997 0.2206 0.2382 0.231 0.281 0.2723 0.3134 0.2902 0.3415 
Stocks sorted monthly based on our predicted probability of default and placed in ten portfolios of equal size. 
Portfolio 1 contains the firms with the lowest probability of default and Portfolio 10 those with highest predicted 
distress risk. We rebalance the portfolios every month from January 2002 to December 2015 based on the stocks’ 
updated distress risk. This table shows, for each portfolio, average estimated probability of default, average monthly 
returns for the 12 months following portfolio formation, and coefficients from a 6-factor regression: RM equals the 
return of a weighted average of country index returns minus the risk-free rate, and SMB and HML are the returns of 
factor-mimicking portfolios constructed as in Fama and French (1993). The other factors (coefficients not shown) 
are momentum, short-term reversal, and long-term reversal. 
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For each portfolio ordered from least to most distressed, this figure shows the coefficients on the Fama-French 
factors from the 6-factor regression. 
Figure 1.9: Portfolio Factor Loadings 
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This figure plots six-factor alphas and their respective 95% confidence intervals for 10 portfolios sorted by distress 
risk. 
Figure 1.10: Six-Factor Alphas 
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Table 1.8: Returns on Long-Short Portfolios 
LS90-10 LS80-20  
Mean 12-month returns 0.013† 0.011† 
6-factor alpha 0.011*** 0.010*** 
RM 0.050 0.038 
SMB 0.276*** 0.235*** 
HML 0.153** 0.122* 
For long-short portfolios LS90-10 and LS80-20 (long the riskiest and short the safest one and two deciles, 
respectively), this table shows average 12-month future returns and alphas and Fama-French factors from a six-
factor regression. ***, **, and * indicate three levels of statistical significance of the coefficients: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.10, respectively. † indicate p < 0.01 in a t-test of means. 
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CHAPTER 2: LESSONS UNLEARNED? CORPORATE DEBT IN EMERGING 
MARKETS22 
2.1 Overview 
This paper documents a set of new stylized facts about leverage and financial fragility for 
emerging market firms following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Corporate debt vulnerability 
indicators during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) attributed to corporate financial roots provide 
a benchmark for comparison. Firm-level data show that post-GFC, emerging market corporate 
balance sheet indicators have not deteriorated to AFC crisis-country levels. However, more 
countries are close to or in the “vulnerable” range of Altman’s Z-score, and average leverage for 
the entire emerging market sample is higher in the post-GFC period than during the AFC. 
Regression estimates suggest that the relationship between leverage, exchange rate depreciations, 
and corporate financial distress is time varying. Also, a central finding is that firm size is 
correlated with corporate distress and, further, that currency depreciations amplify the impact of 
leverage on financial vulnerability for large firms during a crisis. Consistent with Gabaix (2011) 
the paper finds a granularity effect in that large firms are systemically important—idiosyncratic 
shocks to the sales growth of large firms significantly correlate with GDP growth in our 
emerging markets sample. Relatedly, the sales growth of large firms with higher leverage is more 
adversely impacted by exchange rate shocks. While this result holds for the average country in 
our sample, there is substantial cross-country heterogeneity. 
                                                 
22 Alfaro, L.; Asis, G., Chari, A. and Panizza, U. Lessons Unlearned? Corporate Debt in Emerging Markets. Journal 
of International Economics. Submitted, 2018. 
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2.2 Introduction 
There was a rapid credit expansion in emerging-market countries in the aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). A surge in foreign borrowing and deterioration in net external 
debt positions accompanied the increase in domestic credit (BIS, 2014; IMF, 2015). The non-
financial corporate sector accounts for the lion’s share of this surge in leverage, which also 
accounts for large increases in international bond issuance (BIS, 2016). The total domestic and 
international debt of emerging market-based non-financial firms rose from $2.4 trillion to $3.7 
trillion, and outstanding international bonds grew from $360 billion to $1.1 trillion between 2007 
and 2015 (BIS, 2016). 
The impact of monetary policy reversals in advanced economies on emerging-market 
sovereign debt premia, in conjunction with low corporate profitability and market valuations, 
have the potential to cause severe liquidity problems for emerging market firms.23 Nearly $1 
trillion flowed out of emerging markets in the first three-quarters of 2015, eclipsing the outflows 
during the GFC.24  Understanding potential vulnerabilities require knowing more about the state 
of emerging market corporate balance sheets and their potential impact on the macroeconomy. 
Our paper fills this gap. 
In this paper, we show that the relationships between leverage, exchange rate 
depreciations, and corporate financial distress are time varying—this result is new. In particular, 
controlling for firm characteristics, the relationship between (i) leverage and distress scores and 
                                                 
23 The growth in corporate profits has slowed considerably and the return on invested capital in emerging-market 
firms has significantly declined since the financial crisis. As evidence, emerging markets usually trade at a lower 
valuation than their advanced-economy counterparts, and while these relative valuations increased in the aftermath 
of the GFC, emerging markets are trading at a discount again.  
24 A number of direct and indirect channels can transmit shocks to highly leveraged non-financial corporates to the 
domestic economy. For example, a deterioration of credit quality of corporate borrowers or a sudden withdrawal of 
funds from the domestic financial system by firms that are unable to roll-over their international obligations can 
impair the domestic banking system (Acharya et. al., 2015). 
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(ii) leverage, currency depreciation and distress scores varies across the crisis and tranquil 
periods in our sample.  A key finding is that firm size plays a critical role in the relationship 
between these three variables. Specifically, there is an inverse correlation between firm size and 
corporate distress scores and, further, currency depreciations amplify the impact of leverage on 
financial vulnerability for large firms during a crisis. Therefore, we go on to investigate the role 
of large firms and the amplification of macroeconomic vulnerabilities in emerging markets. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to document these facts and implications.  
The analysis proceeds in the following steps. First, we examine differences in leverage 
and other indicators of corporate vulnerability immediately prior and during the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC), the intervening tranquil period and the post-GFC period. Then, we present a 
formal regression analysis that highlights the importance of the interaction between leverage and 
exchange rate movements on corporate distress scores in the different sub-periods. This 
interaction provides indirect evidence for the relative importance of foreign currency debt in 
different periods, a variable that is not observable in balance sheet data. The regression analysis 
also brings to light the importance of firm size as it shows that, all else equal, it is the larger 
firms that are more vulnerable.  
Next, we explore the role of large firms and their importance for the overall economic 
performance in emerging markets. We believe that this is the first paper to formally test the role 
of Gabaix (2011) and others’ granularity idea using emerging market data.  We find that while 
large firms are less leveraged than small firms, they may have a more risky type of leverage as 
large firms corporate distress scores deteriorate more significantly in response to exchange rate 
depreciations. In conjunction with the contributions that large firms make to the overall 
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economic performance in emerging markets, the leverage vulnerabilities of these firms may, 
therefore, warrant particular attention from policy makers.   
Note again that there is considerable concern about the recent increase in dollar 
borrowing by emerging market firms (BIS, 2015, Avdjiev et al., 2014, and Acharya et al., 2015). 
Our paper is the first to provide evidence of the macroeconomic consequences of the links 
between leverage, currency movements, and firm size. Given that disaggregate data on the 
liability composition (currency, maturity, type of lender) of non-financial firms are not available, 
our tests are a valuable and novel contribution to the literature. The details of the analysis follow 
below. 
To reiterate, the first objective of this paper is to document a set of stylized facts about 
leverage and financial fragility in the non-financial corporate sector in emerging markets. We use 
detailed firm-level data to document stylized facts about the evolution of corporate leverage and 
its relationship to financial fragility in emerging markets over the last twenty years.  With this 
data in hand, we compare corporate debt immediately before and during the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC) with corporate debt in emerging markets in the aftermath of the GFC. The AFC 
serves as the benchmark that allows us to answer the following question: How do corporate debt 
vulnerability indicators in emerging markets today compare with these indicators on the eve of 
the AFC?25 In particular, how is corporate financial fragility related to leverage and other 
pertinent firm characteristics? While research on the state of corporate balance sheets in 
emerging markets shows that leverage and foreign currency exposure of emerging-market-based 
                                                 
25 Chari and Henry (2015) use this methodological approach to compare and contrast the fiscal policy response and 
its impact on the recovery of GDP growth in the aftermath of the AFC to examine Europe’s pivot from stimulus to 
austerity and the impact on European growth in the aftermath of its crisis. 
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corporates have increased, a lack of relevant benchmarks prevents prior studies from assessing 
the magnitude of the risks brought about by these trends (IMF 2015).  
The second objective of our paper is to provide such a benchmark by comparing the 
current situation with the evolution of corporate balance sheets during the AFC.  Why the AFC? 
Historically, emerging market crises arose from sovereign debt problems, and twin banking and 
currency crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). However, the underlying microeconomic roots 
attributed to the AFC include corporate debt vulnerabilities (Pomerleano,1998; Corsetti et al. 
1999) as well as implicit guarantees and moral hazard (Krugman 1998, Craig, et al. 2003). The 
crisis was accompanied by widespread corporate failures due to adverse balance sheet effects via 
currency and maturity mismatches at the firm level. Corporate debt levels associated with the 
AFC, therefore, serve as a natural benchmark to assess corporate sector vulnerabilities in 
emerging markets today.   
Third, we ask whether leverage poses a risk to the health of emerging market firms. To 
test this, we regress corporate fragility on leverage and other firm characteristics and 
macroeconomic control variables, focusing on different periods, sectors, and exchange rate 
regimes.  
Fourth, as noted by Gabaix (2011), the largest firms dominate economic activity across 
many countries and shocks to the largest firms can affect total output as these shocks do not get 
diversified in the aggregate data.26,27 The role of large firms is particularly critical in many 
emerging markets.   
                                                 
26 See also Acemoglu et al. (2016) and Acemoglu et al. (2017). 
27 Note that weak bank balance sheets and non-performing loans leading up to the AFC were arguably associated 
with corporate sector weaknesses (see Corsetti et al., 1999).  
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The final objective of the paper is to carefully examine whether the most levered and 
financially fragile firms are also the most systemically important. In particular, implicitly the 
vulnerabilities of systemically large firms are intimately linked to bailout guarantees and moral 
hazard issues in emerging market lending where widespread corporate debt vulnerabilities can 
turn into full-blown financial crises.  
We compile extensive firm-level data between 1992 and 2014 from Worldscope and 
Osiris for 26 countries classified as emerging markets by the Bank of International Settlements 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam). We exclude financial firms 
from our analysis. The firm-level data provide different indicators from the balance sheets and 
income statements to analyze cash flows, leverage, liquidity, solvency, and profitability ratios—
the returns on equity and invested capital.  
To document the stylized facts, we split the sample into two subperiods: AFC (1996-
1998) and post-GFC (2008-2014). We compare the post-GFC indicators to two benchmarks: (i) a 
within-country comparison relative to 1996-1998 values for a given indicator; and (ii) a crisis-
country comparison to the 1996-1998 average of the five Asian countries involved in the AFC 
(Asian Crisis Five).28,29 We find that the within-country cross-time benchmark and the Asian 
Crisis Five benchmark yield varying cross-country patterns of results. 
                                                 
28 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. 
29 In robustness analyses, we also exclude, obtaining similar results, the period 1999-2002 to avoid contaminating 
our tests with emerging market crises which were associated with sovereign debt episodes as the Russian, Brazilian, 
and Argentine crises of the late 1990s early 2000s were not clearly attributable to corporate leverage, (see Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009).   
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In particular, the data reveal the following stylized facts.  First, over half of the emerging 
markets in our sample display increased leverage in the post-GFC period. However, no emerging 
market country has leverage ratios that exceed the average of the Asian Crisis Five on the eve 
and during the Asian Financial crisis. Second, half our sample countries have higher short-term 
liquidity needs measured by current to total liabilities compared to the Asian Crisis Five. Third, 
about 91% of countries in the sample have stronger solvency positions, measured by coverage 
ratios, in the post-GFC period than the Asian Crisis Five during the AFC.30 Fourth, a measure of 
corporate financial fragility (Altman’s (2005) emerging-market Z-score) shows that post-GFC, a 
larger number of countries are in or close to the grey or “vulnerable zone” than in the AFC 
period. However, while South Korea was in the distress zone during the AFC, there are no 
countries in the distress zone in the post-GFC period. In summary, our data show that post-GFC, 
emerging market corporate balance sheet indicators have not deteriorated to AFC crisis-country 
levels. However, more countries are close to or in the “vulnerable” range of Altman’s Z-score  
(in the “grey zone” or barely above the threshold) and average leverage for the entire emerging 
market sample is higher in the post-GFC sub period than during the AFC.            
Next, we formally analyze the relationship between leverage and corporate financial 
fragility at the firm level controlling for a variety of firm, sector, and country-level 
(macroeconomic) factors. Regression estimates confirm that during the AFC and in the aftermath 
of the GFC, there is a negative and statistically significant correlation between leverage and firm 
financial fragility. In other words, firms with higher leverage have Z-scores that are closer to the 
financial distress range. The data also show that currency depreciation amplifies the negative 
impact of leverage Z-scores during the Asian Financial Crisis.  
                                                 
30 This could be a result of higher liabilities, lower profitability or a combination of the two. 
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To examine whether the leverage and corporate financial fragility patterns can portend 
adverse macroeconomic consequences, we examine the role of large firms in the macroeconomy. 
Consistent with Gabaix (2011) we find that large firms are systemically important—idiosyncratic 
shocks to large firms significantly correlate with GDP growth in our sample of emerging 
markets. We also find that while large firms are, on average, less leveraged than smaller firms, 
the more-levered large firms are more vulnerable to exchange rate shocks than smaller firms with 
comparable levels of leverage. While this result holds for the average country in our sample, we 
also find that there is substantial cross-country heterogeneity. 
Our paper is related to several strands of literature.  First, the paper contributes to the 
literature on the recent evolution of corporate debt in the aftermath of the GFC. IMF (2015) 
documents the main trends and shows that global factors drive the increase in corporate leverage 
following the GFC. This finding is in line with Shin’s (2013) view that the response to the crisis 
led to a sudden increase in global liquidity. Acharya et al. (2015) present several case studies and 
evaluate vulnerabilities and potential policy responses.  
The paper is also related to the literature on the origins of the AFC. Several papers 
suggest that weak fundamentals and excessive risk-taking by corporates caused the crisis. The 
“crony capitalism” view suggests that the increase in corporate leverage was due to moral hazard 
attributed to weak banking supervision and implicit guarantees for well-connected borrowers 
(Corsetti et al., 1998, Claessens and Glaessner, 1997, Krugman, 1998, Johnson et al., 2000; 
Burnside et al., 2001, 2003).31  Pomerleano (1998) uses firm-level data and finds that excessive 
                                                 
31 An alternative view as in Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998), and Stiglitz and Bhattacharya 
(2000) maintains that there was nothing particularly wrong with the pre-crisis fundamentals of most East Asian 
economies.  
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leverage and poor financial performance in the corporate sector caused the AFC.32 More 
generally, this paper relates to the literature documenting the association between rapid credit 
growth and the building of corporate leverage and financial crises (Mendoza and Terrones 2008, 
and Schularick and Taylor, 2012). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.3 presents trends in broad macro-indicators to 
motivate the analysis. Section 2.4 describes the firm-level data. Section 2.5 uses the AFC as a 
benchmark to detail stylized facts about leverage and corporate financial fragility, and Section 
2.6 presents formal firm-level regression results. Section 2.7 analyzes the interplay between 
emerging-market corporate fragility and the macroeconomy. Section 2.8 concludes. 
2.3 The Post-GFC Rise in Emerging Market Borrowing  
In the aftermath of the GFC, advanced economies were characterized by increases in 
government borrowing and household and corporate deleveraging.33 Emerging markets stand in 
stark contrast. Over 2001-2007 average credit to the non-financial sector in emerging market 
countries remained close to 120% of GDP. The GFC caused a sudden reduction in credit, which 
went from 122% of GDP in 2007 to 109% in 2008. Credit started expanding rapidly in 2009 and 
reached 175% of GDP in 2015, a 67-percentage point increase with respect to the 2008 trough 
                                                 
32 Ghosh et al. (2002) also show that in 1995–96 several East Asian countries had debt ratios and share of short-term 
debt which were significantly higher than debt ratios and short-term debt shares in OECD countries. Claessens et al. 
(2000) suggest that corporate financial risk factors may have been an amplifying factor in the crisis. 
33 Low global interest rates notwithstanding, the higher leverage led to a rapid increase in the debt service ratios of 
emerging market borrowers. In a period when the average debt service ratio of Advanced Economies decreased from 
21 to 18 percent, the average debt service ratio of emerging markets increased from 10 to 12.5 percent. In a subset of 
emerging economies characterized by rapid credit expansion, debt service ratios surpassed the advanced economy 
average (BIS credit statistics). 
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(Figure 2.1).  Borrowing by non-financial corporations was a key driver of this surge in 
leverage—corporate debt went from 57% to 101% of GDP over 2008-15.34  
There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across emerging market countries (Figure 
2.2). By the end of 2015 total domestic credit to the non-financial sector was above 200 percent 
of GDP in China and South Korea and below 100 percent of GDP in Argentina, Indonesia, 
Mexico, and Russia. Borrowing by non-financial corporations is important in China, Korea, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, and Turkey.35 According to BIS data, in the case of China the total 
credit-to-GDP ratio for the non-financial sector went from 150% in 2008 to nearly 250% in 
2015, with borrowing by non-financial corporations increasing from 100% to 166% of GDP. If 
we exclude China from our sample of emerging market countries we find a more moderate credit 
expansion (solid line in Figure 2.1).   
Non-financial corporations also played a key role in international bond issuances.36 Over 
2008-2015, outstanding international bonds issued by non-financial corporations grew from $360 
billion (approximately 30% of total outstanding bonds) to $1.1 trillion (more than 40% of total 
outstanding bonds).  Issuances by non-financial corporations were particularly important in Asia 
and Latin America, where they now represent nearly 50% of total outstanding bonds. In addition, 
by 2015, total claims of BIS reporting banks on emerging markets and outstanding international 
securities issued by emerging market nationals surpassed $5.8 trillion, representing an 80% 
increase over emerging-market liabilities in 2007. The largest increases, both in percentage and 
                                                 
34 Over the same period, household debt increased by 12 percentage points and government debt increased by 9 
percentage points. 
35 While borrowing by households is important in Malaysia and Thailand, public sector borrowing is relatively more 
important in Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico, and Argentina. See Alfaro and Kanczuk (2013). 
36 In 2015, borrowing by non-financial corporation accounted for about 25 percent of EM cross-border borrowing 
from BIS reporting banks. 
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absolute terms, were in Emerging Asia and Latin America (148% and 93%, respectively).37 The 
increase in leverage was particularly important in non-tradable cyclical sectors such as 
construction.   
The figures for Asia and, to some extent, Latin America are however driven by two 
important outliers. As mentioned, liabilities by Chinese nationals increased by 500 percent and, 
if we remove China from the Asian total, we find a more modest increase in foreign liabilities (a 
58% increase compared to 148%). In the case of Latin America, instead, removing Brazil from 
the total brings down the increase in foreign liabilities from 93% to 76%. Brazil and China 
account for 48% of the increase in total claims of BIS reporting banks on EMs and outstanding 
international securities issued by EM nationals, and excluding Brazil and China from the EM 
total reduces the percentage increase of these liabilities from 80% to 45%.   
As the introduction mentions, domestic credit expansion in emerging markets was 
accompanied by a surge in foreign borrowing.38 In 2007 foreign currency bonds represented 16 
percent of international debt by emerging market-based non-financial corporations and by 2014 
the foreign currency share had grown to 22 percent (IMF, 2015).39 However, the increase in 
leverage and foreign currency debt documented above took place in an environment of ample 
global liquidity and record low policy rates in advanced economies. Emerging market-based 
                                                 
37 Alfaro, Chari, and Kanczuk (2017) analyze the effects of Brazilian capital control policies.  
38 Total cross-border claims on EMs by BIS reporting banks increased from $2.4 trillion in 2008 to a peak of $3.7 
trillion on 2014. Data for 2015 indicates a $200 billion retreat, with total cross-border claims standing just below 
$3.5 trillion (Table 2.2).   
39 The share of dollar-denominated bonds issued by non-financial corporations is higher than the overall share of 
dollar-denominated bonds. 
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corporates have therefore borrowed at longer maturities and lower yields.40 Recent fears are that, 
as monetary policy conditions in the US normalize, they could trigger a wave of corporate 
failures in a number of emerging economies.  
2.4 Data 
Firm-level data are from Worldscope (gathered through Datastream) and Osiris.41 Our 
dataset choice is driven by the nature of the exercise. We are not aware of any other firm-level 
dataset with a better coverage of emerging market countries going back to the 1990s.42  
Both sources provide detailed historical information for listed and unlisted firms for a 
wide sample of countries. We compared Worldscope and Osiris’ coverage for emerging markets 
and chose the data source with the most data availability for each country. Osiris had better 
coverage for China and India, while Worldscope dominated for all other countries. Column 1 in 
Table D1 shows total sales of firms in our database by country as a percentage of the country’s 
total market capitalization, as computed by the World Bank. We find this a better measure of 
sample coverage than Sales/GDP because the large majority of the firms in our database are 
publicly listed, and the size of the listed market relative to GDP varies significantly by country, 
as Column 2 shows. 
                                                 
40 Maturity went from the pre-crisis average of 5 years to more than six years and average yields decreased from 8 to 
6 percent (IMF, 2015). 
41 The Worldscope database provides detailed historical financial statement information for the world’s leading 
public and private companies. Osiris, published by Bureau van Dijk, has information as well on listed, and major 
unlisted/delisted, companies around the world. All data for tangible fixed assets is also from Osiris. When extracting 
data from Osiris, we restricted the sample to include sales information.   
42 Given that a key objective of our exercise is to compare the current situation with the Asian Crisis period, we need 
data for the 1990s. In alternative sources such as Orbis data, it is impossible to obtain a consistent data set of private 
and public firms for our period of interest in particular for emerging markets. For example, Di Giovanni and 
Levchenko’s (2013) show that between 2006 and 2008 there were only 44 countries (mostly OECD and Eastern 
European countries) for which Orbis had firm-level data on sales for at least 1000 firms.   
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The sample consists of data on non-financial firms from 1992–2014 for the main 
countries classified as emerging markets by the Bank of International Settlements. These are 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. Since coverage of Eastern 
European countries is extremely sparse, we group together firms from Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia into ‘Eastern Europe’.  
Overall, the dataset covers primarily larger firms. While a lack of smaller firm coverage 
tends to pose problems in other settings, a focus on large corporations is to our advantage in this 
paper. As mentioned in the introduction, large firms have the propensity to contribute more to 
systemic risk, and thus they are precisely the firms whose financial health is of greatest concern 
to policy-makers. 
Our final sample includes all companies that have data for each indicator of firm 
performance described below. 43 We exclude outliers and all noticeable errors in the data. The 
sample varies from a maximum of 8,286 firms with data on return on invested capital totaling 
(41,888 firm-year observations) to a minimum of 2,986 firms (14,393 observations) with enough 
data to compute Altman’s Emerging Market Z-score. The countries with most firms in the 
database are China, India, and South Korea, and with the least Eastern Europe.  
We use several indicators of corporate financial vulnerabilities and firm performance. For 
leverage, we use as a main indicator the debt to equity ratio (a firm’s total debt divided by its 
common equity), which indicates how much debt a company is using to finance its assets relative 
                                                 
43 The number of companies with data for every variable and year of interest is too small to create a balanced 
sample. Nonetheless, we have performed the analysis maintaining a balanced sample during different periods, 
obtaining similar results (e.g. to analyze yearly debt/assets ratio for the 2008-2014 period, we select for our sample 
all companies that have data for each indicator of Total Debt, Total Assets, and Sales for each year in 2008-2014).  
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to its common equity. As a proxy for liquidity, we use the current ratio (current to total 
liabilities). For solvency, we compute the coverage ratio, the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) over total liabilities to measure a company’s 
ability to use their cash flow to pay back its outstanding liabilities. 
For firm performance, we analyze as well the increase in tangible fixed assets as a proxy 
for investment.  Profitability is captured by the return on equity (ROE) and return on invested 
capital (ROIC). ROE is defined as the amount of net income returned as a percentage of 
shareholders’ equity, and ROIC is the ratio of operating profit (earnings before interest and tax) 
to invested capital (sum of shareholders' equity and debt liabilities).  
As a summary measure of corporate fragility, we calculate the Altman (2005) Emerging 
Market Z-score. The measure weighs four ratios constructed using the firms’ financial statements 
(working capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, operating income to total assets, 
and book value of equity to total liabilities).44 The measure is an enhanced version of the 
standard Z-score model, adjusted to incorporate the characteristics of emerging market firms and 
best suited to assess the relative vulnerability of the sample of countries we consider in this 
paper. Lower Z-scores are associated with greater vulnerability and likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Companies with EM Z-scores greater than 5.85 are considered to be in the “safe zone”, scores 
between 5.85 and 3.75 indicate vulnerability, and scores below 3.75 indicate that the firm is in 
state of distress.   The following table from Altman (2005) compares Z-scores with bond ratings. 
                                                 
44 EM score =6.56 (X1) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72(X3) + 1.05(X4) + 3.25, where X1= working capital/ total assets, 
X2=retained earnings /total assets, X3=operating income /total assets, X4=book value of equity /total liabilities. The 
constant term (derived from the median Z`` score for bankrupt US entities) standardizes the analysis so “that a 
default equivalent (D) is consistent with a score below zero.” The use of book value of equity, not market value, was 
motivated by a concern that equity markets may be less liquid than in developed markets. Altman (2005) adjusts the 
measure to consider currency devaluation vulnerability, industry adjustments (relative to U.S.); competitiveness 
position adjustment (dominant firms in the industry due to size, political influence, etc.); special debt issue figure 
(collateral or bona fide, high-quality guarantor); sovereign spread (comparison to US corporate bond of the same 
rating). 
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Table 2.1. Altman’s EM Z-Score and Bond Rating 
 Z' Score Rating   Z' Score Rating  
S
af
e 
Z
o
n
e 
 > 8.15 AAA  5.65 - 5.85 BBB- 
G
rey
 Z
o
n
e 
7.60 - 8.15 AA+  5.25 - 5.65 BB+ 
7.30 - 7.60 AA  4.95 - 5.25 BB 
7.00 - 7.30 AA_  4.75 - 4.95 BB- 
6.85 - 7.00 A+  4.50 - 4.75 B+ 
6.65 - 6.85 A  4.15 - 4.50 B 
6.40 - 6.65 A-  3.75 - 4.15 B- 
6.25 - 6.40 BBB+      
D
istress Z
o
n
e 
5.85 - 6.25 BBB  3.20 - 3.75 CCC+ 
 
     2.50 - 3.20 CCC 
 
     1.75 - 2.50 CCC- 
             < 1.75 D 
 
To further validate our use of Altman’s EM Z-score as a proxy for (the inverse of) 
corporate financial fragility, we test its ability to predict exit from the sample. We find that firms 
with low Z-scores are more likely to exit the sample the next period. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation (corresponding to a 4.7%) decrease in the Z-score is associated with a 2% increase in 
the probability that the firm will not be in the sample in the following year. This outcome allows 
us to think of the Z-score as a rough proxy for distance to default.45 
2.5 Corporate Fragility in Emerging Markets: Stylized Facts 
We begin by comparing corporate financial fragility indicators during the AFC – which 
was deemed to have corporate financial roots – with the same indicators following the GFC, a 
period characterized by the rapid build-up in emerging market corporate debt. To do so, we 
divide the data into two periods: AFC (1996-1998) and post-GFC (2008-2014).46 We use the 
                                                 
45 Specifically, we run a regression where the dependent variable is an “exit” dummy, which takes a value of one if a 
firm that was in the sample in year t-1and year t-2 is not in the sample in year t and takes a value of zero if a firm 
that was in the sample in year t-1 and year t-2 is still in the sample in year t. The explanatory variables are the t-1 
value of the Z-score and a set of firm fixed effects. We find that the coefficient is -0.005 with a standard error of 
0.0019. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to check whether the Z score predicts survival.  
46 We also compared results against an average of the period 1992-1997. The main results and implications are 
similar.  
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indicators described in Section 2.4 to analyze corporate fragility and profitability using data from 
the balance sheet, income statements, and cash flows.  For different indicators of corporate 
financial vulnerabilities and firm performance, Table 2.2: Total Claims on Emerging Market 
Countries, BIS reporting Banks (billion USD) and Figures 2.3-2.6 present several stylized facts 
via weighted mean values using sales (as a proxy for size) as the weights. The weighted means 
are calculated for all firms in a country by year. The yearly weighted means are then averaged 
for each of the two sub-periods, also by country. We also analyze simple means and simple and 
weighted medians.  The Asian Crisis Five include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea 
and Thailand.  
Leverage: Panel A of Table 2.3 presents the findings for changes in leverage levels 
(weighted means), measured as the debt to equity ratio for the firms in the sample.47 It is 
important to note that the debt to equity ratio provides a more striking perspective on a firm's 
leverage position than the debt to assets ratio. For example, South Korea’s AFC average debt to 
asset ratio of 68% for the firms in our sample seems less burdensome than its debt to equity ratio 
of more than 280%, which implies that debt obligations are more than twice as high as 
shareholder commitments.  
We also documented the patterns for the simple means and medians, as well as the 
weighted median. Here a point about the relevance of the summary statistic used is worth noting. 
In general, the weighted median measure attenuates the distributional consequences of 
observations in the tails of a distribution. In many circumstances, this adjustment is warranted to 
                                                 
47 The debt to equity is a leverage ratio that compares a company's total liabilities to its total shareholder’s equity. 
The measure provides information about the magnitude of the commitments from lenders and creditors to a firm 
compared to the magnitude of shareholder commitments. The debt to equity ratio therefore provides an alternative 
lens from which to view a firm's leverage position by comparing total liabilities to shareholders' equity rather than to 
assets. Similar to the debt to assets ratio, a lower percentage means that a company is using less leverage and has a 
stronger equity position. 
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ensure that outliers do not drive the results. In other words, if a few observations skew the 
weighted mean, the weighted median that adjusts for non-uniform statistical weights and gives 
the 50% weighted percentile measure is the more appropriate statistic. However, in the case of 
leverage and measuring the overall riskiness of corporate debt for the financial system in a 
country, we would like to assess the upper bound of the risk. If a few large firms are also the 
ones with the highest leverage, it is desirable to give a larger weight to these observations since 
arguably these firms have the greatest potential to generate systemic risk—we focus on these 
large firms in Section 2.7. We therefore present the main results using the (sales) weighted mean 
rather than the weighted median while recognizing that the weighted median provides a useful 
alternative benchmark.  
Columns 1 and 2 present the firm level weighted mean leverage by country for our two 
periods: one year before and during the AFC (1996-98) and post-GFC (2008-14). Column 1 
shows that the average debt to equity ratio in the Asian Crisis Five was close to 145% while the 
average for the full emerging market sample was 80%. Column 3 counts the number of countries 
with higher average leverage during the post-GFC than during the AFC, revealing that 56% of 
countries48 (10 out of 18) have higher average leverage ratios in the post-GFC period. Column 4 
tabulates how many countries have higher average leverage during the post-GFC years than the 
average of the Asian Crisis Five during the AFC. It shows that all countries have lower leverage 
post-GFC than the Asian Crisis Five did on the eve and in the midst of the crisis. Figure 2.3 
confirms these patterns visually.  
For purposes of illustration it is interesting to note the patterns we obtain when we use the 
(sales) weighted median instead of the weighted mean. First, in the AFC period the weighted 
                                                 
48 Data for Jordan following the Global Financial crises was patchy for leverage.  
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median leverage ratios for the Asian Crisis Five and full emerging market sample are much 
lower than the weighted mean, close to 93% and 67%, respectively. Second, 14 out of 19 
countries have a higher post-GFC weighted median. Third, three countries have a higher 
weighted median compared to the Asian Crisis Five.  
Liquidity: Panel B of Table 2.3 provides the (sales) weighted mean of the current to total 
liabilities ratio by country to analyze the liquidity needs of the firms in our sample.49 Column 3 
suggests that six countries demonstrate a higher current to total liability ratio in the post-GFC 
sub-period. Column 4 shows that 11 out of the 22 countries have higher short-term liquidity 
needs compared to the Asian Crisis Five. Figure 2.4 presents a graphical representation of these 
patterns. 
Solvency: The coverage ratio is a measure of a firm's ability to meet its obligations to 
lenders. Generally, the higher the coverage ratio, the better the ability of the firm to fulfill its 
debt obligations. Common coverage ratios include the interest coverage ratio, debt service 
coverage ratio and the asset coverage ratio. The interest payment and debt service ratio data are 
very sparse in our sample of emerging market firms. We therefore use a modified version of the 
coverage ratio – the ratio of EBITDA to total liabilities. By definition, this modified ratio will be 
biased downward as total liabilities exceed interest expenses or other debt obligations used to 
calculate more standard versions of the coverage ratio. Nevertheless it provides a useful snapshot 
of a firm’s solvency position.  
In Panel C of Table 2.3, we see that the pre-crisis coverage ratio average of the Asian 
Crisis Five has increased. The average for the full emerging markets sample on the other hand 
                                                 
49 Current liabilities measure a firm's debts and other obligations that are due within one year and include short-term 
debt, accounts payable, accrued liabilities and other debts. Note that current liabilities provide a more 
comprehensive measure of a firm’s short-term liquidity needs compared to short-term debt since it includes accounts 
payable and accrued liabilities.  
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has remained unchanged. Column 3 shows that half of the countries have coverage ratios that are 
lower than their AFC levels, but 20 countries have coverage ratios that exceed that of the Asian 
Crisis Five. Figure 2.5 visually confirms these patterns. 
Profitability: Next we examine the profitability of the firms in our sample (Panel D, 
Table 2.3). We use two measures: the return on invested capital (ROIC) and the return on equity 
(ROE). A concern with increased leverage is that if it is accompanied by a slowdown in 
profitability, firms will find it more difficult to service their debt obligations. Unlike equity, debt 
is a non-contingent claim that needs to be met regardless of the state of firm profits. Firm-level 
liquidity and solvency ratios therefore feature some measure of earnings relative to debt service 
obligations to provide a measure of a firm’s flexibility with respect to these obligations.  
Panel D shows that while the ROIC for the Asian Crisis Five during the AFC was close 
to 7% the number for the overall emerging markets sample was approximately 10%. In the post-
GFC period, the average ROIC across all emerging markets in our sample was similar to the 
AFC sample period. However, 77% of countries (17 out of 22) had higher profitability post-GFC 
than the Asian Crisis Five during the AFC. The fact that the Asian crisis five countries had 
significantly worse profitability during the Asian crisis and the emerging market averages for 
profitability are the same in the AFC and GFC periods suggests that profitability has fallen 
between the two periods for the countries not involved in the AFC. This pattern indicates that a 
broader sample of emerging markets have subpar profitability in the post-GFC period.  
Interestingly, consistent with an increase in leverage, the return on equity (ROE) shows a 
much different pattern (not reported in Table D). Note that increased leverage (debt) increases 
the expected rate of return on the equity simply because leveraged investments are riskier than 
unlevered ones. The average ROE went from negative to 13% for the Asian Crisis Five across 
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the two sample periods while the overall emerging market average increased from 9% to 14%. 
More than half the sample of countries has higher ROE values in the post-GFC period compared 
to the AFC period. Strikingly, post-GFC, most of the countries have higher ROE values 
compared to the Asian Crisis Five during the AFC. 
Corporate Fragility: As mentioned in section 2.4, Altman’s Emerging Market Z-score 
can be used as a composite summary statistic for corporate fragility. The measure is composed of 
various income statement and balance sheet items: the ratios of working capital, retained 
earnings, and operating income to total assets, as well as the book value of assets to total 
liabilities. By combining various aspects of firm operations, it paints an overall picture of 
corporate health. The advantage of the approach, as the data section shows, is that the different 
ranges of “safe”, “grey” and “distress” can be correlated with corporate ratings letter grades used 
by credit rating agencies. Altman modifies the summary statistics to account for different 
structural characteristics of emerging market firms; e.g. he replaces the market value of assets to 
the book value to adjust for the relative trading illiquidity in emerging markets compared to 
advanced economies. The Z-score statistics correspond to AAA to BBB for the safe zone, BBB- 
to B- for the grey zone and CCC+ and below for the distress zone. 
Panel E of Table 2.3 and Figure 2.6 present the results.  Companies with EM Z-scores 
greater than 5.85 are considered to be in the “safe zone”, scores between 5.85 and 3.75 indicate 
vulnerability, and scores below 3.75 indicate that the firm is in state of distress. Figure 2.6 shows 
that among the Asian Crisis Five, South Korea was in the distress zone during the AFC period. 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand were in the grey area, as were China, India, and Pakistan.  
The only Asian country in the safe zone was Taiwan. In Latin America, while Argentina and 
Brazil were in the grey zone, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru were in the safe zone. Note also 
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that both Turkey and South Africa were in the safe zone. The average Z-score for the Asian 
Crisis Five was 5.2 (grey zone) and the AFC emerging market average was 6.1 (safe zone).  
The picture changes in the post-GFC period. Countries with higher Z-scores in the post-
GFC period are Colombia, Eastern Europe, Malaysia and Indonesia. South Korea moved from 
the distress zone into the safe zone. China, India and Turkey are in the grey zone as is Mexico. 
The picture suggests that the issues of corporate vulnerability apply to a broader set of emerging 
markets in the post-GFC period given the number of countries in or barely above the grey zone. 
It is worth pointing out that there are no countries in the distress zone post-GFC. Also, note that 
some of the countries in the safe zone show a fall in their Z-scores compared to their AFC scores 
and are now barely over the grey zone threshold. If the Altman Z-score provides a leading 
indicator of the potential for distress, the data suggest that corporate financial vulnerabilities are 
more widespread now than during the AFC period.  
Summary: Thus far, we have contrasted a range of firm-level indicators related to 
corporate fragility and profitability prior to and during the AFC of 1998 and the aftermath of the 
GFC of 2008–2009. We compare the indicators using two benchmarks: (i) a within-country 
cross-time comparison to the 1996-1998 values for a given indicator; and (ii) a comparison 
relative to the 1996-1998 average of the Asian Crisis Five. 
In the 1996-1998 period, East Asian corporates had greater leverage and financial 
vulnerabilities than corporates in other emerging markets. While there is substantial cross-
country heterogeneity in the post-GFC period, our data suggest that more countries have higher 
leverage and are in or close to the “grey zone” post-GFC than in the AFC period, implying a 
higher risk of financial distress. It is important to note that the analysis of the East Asian crisis is 
“ex-post” in that we examine the leverage of the Asian countries that were eventually hit by a 
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crisis. The leverage levels in these countries therefore provide a useful “worst case scenario” 
benchmark against which to assess leverage-related vulnerabilities in the post-GFC period. Note 
also that while warning lights are flashing regarding these vulnerabilities, thus far no emerging 
market country is actually in crisis. Therefore, we do not have a single country with leverage 
akin to the Asian Crisis Five in the red “distress” zone.  
The appendix includes a table that helps visualize some of our findings through heat 
maps for leverage and Altman’s Z-score. The maps confirm our prior observations that East 
Asian corporates had greater leverage and financial fragility than corporates in other emerging 
markets during the AFC, that the AFC period displays the greatest heterogeneity across countries 
(both in leverage and Z-score), and that leverage and financial fragility have surged for several 
countries in the post-GFC period. 
2.6 Corporate Fragility in Emerging Markets: Firm Level Evidence 
In the previous section we found that in the post-GFC period more countries are in 
Altman's grey zone for corporate fragility or barely above the threshold. In this section we delve 
further into the firm-level data and run regressions to examine the link between corporate 
financial fragility and leverage as well as the role of firm-characteristics—in particular firm size. 
We also examine the impact of macroeconomic and institutional factors such as exchange rates, 
economic growth, and financial globalization interacted with leverage on the corporate distress 
scores.   
As a first step, we examine whether the relationship between leverage and Z-score is 
different across time periods by estimating the following model:50 
𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑐,𝑡 + (𝛽1𝐷1 + 𝛽2𝐷2 + 𝛽3𝐷3)𝐿𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡  (3) 
                                                 
50 In the regressions, the variables are Winsorized at 5%. The results are robust to using 1% Winsorization as well as 
no Winsorization.  
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where 𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is the Z-score for firm i, country c, year t; 𝐿𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is leverage for firm i, country c, year 
t; 𝛼𝑖 are firm fixed effects; 𝛿𝑐,𝑡 are country-year fixed effects; D1 is a dummy that takes a value 
of 1 for years 1996-98 (the AFC period and its run-up); D2 is a dummy for years 2003-2007 
(tranquil period); and D3 is a dummy for years 2008-14 (post-GFC period). In the baseline 
regression, we exclude 1992-1995 from the regressions because we have a small number of firms 
for this period. We also exclude 1999-2002 to avoid contaminating our tests with emerging 
market crises associated with sovereign – not corporate – debt episodes (i.e. Russian, Brazilian, 
and Argentinean crises). However, as a robustness check we include these years and more 
generally, find that the results remain robust to alternate specifications of the subsamples. 
We begin by examining the unconditional correlation between leverage and the Altman’s 
Z-score across the three sub-periods, i.e., with a specification that does not include compositional 
controls.  In other words, we start by estimating specification (1), but without firm and country-
year fixed effects. Column 1 of Table 2.4 examines the impact of leverage on the Altman’s Z-
score across three sub-periods.  𝛽1, 𝛽2,  and 𝛽3 measure the correlation between leverage ant 
the Z-score in the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) period, the tranquil period (Tranquil), and the 
post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) periods.  
Column 1 shows that leverage is negatively correlated with the Z score, i.e., scores for 
firms with high leverage are closer to the distress range. The effect is statistically significant at 
the 1% level in all three periods. A potential concern with the econometric specification in 
Column 1, however, is that the ratio of Book-Value-of-Equity to Total Liabilities, a component 
of the Altman’s Z-score, is by construction negatively correlated with our measure of leverage. 
Therefore, one might argue that the relationship between leverage and the Z-score is hard-wired 
and endogenous. This subtle point is worth emphasizing. On the one hand, at first pass it may 
 79 
appear that “leverage is regressed on leverage.”  However, note that this holds because leverage 
is part of the Z score, but not an entirely correct interpretation because the specification in 
Column 1 examines whether the relationship between leverage and the Z-score varies over time 
and hence is not limited to the automatic correlation between leverage and the Z-score. 
Although, in Column 1, we find that the coefficients are not statistically significantly different 
from each other, this pattern changes as we include controls for firm observables such as firm 
size and compositional controls in later specifications. 
Nevertheless, to circumvent this concern, we construct a modified Z-score that does not 
include the leverage term and only includes the ratios of working capital, retained earnings and 
operating income to total assets. Higher values of these components drive up the Z-score and are 
a sign of improving corporate health.  Column 2 examines the unconditional correlation between 
leverage and the modified Altman’s Z-score across the three sub-periods. The coefficients on 𝛽1,
𝛽2,  and 𝛽3 , are negative and highly statistically significant. The pattern suggests that there is an 
inverse unconditional correlation between leverage and the modified Altman’s Z-score as well. 
This suggests that firms with higher leverage also have a lower index of working capital, retained 
earnings and operating income relative to total assets.  
In Column 3 we introduce firm observables such as investment and firm size. Size is 
inversely correlated with the modified Z-score, suggesting that, for a given level of leverage, 
larger firms are more financially fragile. Real investment is positively correlated with firm 
financial health. Note that the coefficient on 1 , which measures the impact of leverage on the 
modified Altman’s Z-score during the AFC, loses significance, but the other two coefficients, 
𝛽2,  and 𝛽3 , remain significantly negative. The bottom panel of the table shows that the three 
coefficients are not significantly different from each other.  
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The inverse relationship between firm-size and financial health is of interest as the 
financial vulnerability of large firms is of particular concern to regulators. For example, Chapter 
3 of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 2015) report explicitly states that it is 
“important to closely monitor sectors and systemically important firms most exposed to risks and 
the sectors and large firms closely connected to them, including across the financial system, and 
to prepare for contingencies.” 
Since the results in Columns 2 and 3 do not control for time-invariant unobservable 
heterogeneity at the firm level and time variant unobservable heterogeneity at the country level, 
we go on to include firm fixed effects, as well as country-year fixed effects to control for 
compositional effects at the country and year levels. The results, presented in Column 4, suggest 
that the correlation between leverage and other dimensions of firm resilience captured by the 
modified Z-score is positive and statistically significant during the tranquil period (𝛽2 > 0) and 
remain negative (albeit not statistically significant) in the other two sub-periods. In other words, 
once compositional controls are introduced, better firms, i.e., firms with higher working capital, 
retained earnings and operating income, borrow more during the tranquil sub-period. An 
important pattern to also note in this regard is that the coefficients on leverage (𝛽1, 𝛽2,  and 
𝛽3 ), are time-varying and significantly lower during the AFC and post-GFC periods compared 
to the tranquil period ( 𝛽1 − 𝛽2 < 0  and 𝛽3 − 𝛽2 < 0 ), suggesting that firms with high leverage 
experienced worsening liquidity, solvency and profitability during the AFC and post-GFC 
periods.  
Column 4 also includes a control for firm size. We find that firm size continues to be 
negatively correlated with the modified Z score. This implies that, controlling for leverage, larger 
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firms have significantly lower modified Z-scores, i.e., overall lower values of working capital, 
retained earnings and operating income as fractions of total assets.51  
Turning to the sector-specific dimension, we use a linear regression with dummy 
variables to test whether the relationship between leverage and the Z-score differs across sectors. 
For instance, industries such as energy and mining are traded but exposed to commodity prices. 
Industries such as construction and utilities tend to be non-traded and therefore particularly 
exposed to currency risk when they access international capital markets. Currency mismatches 
associated with excessive foreign currency leverage were one of the root causes of the AFC.  
However, such mismatches may be less damaging for firms that, by operating in the tradable 
sector, may have natural hedges through foreign currency revenues.52  
We observe two patterns. First, in the AFC period the negative correlation between 
leverage and the modified Z-score is not statistically significant in the tradable sector (Column 5, 
Table 2.4), positively correlated with the modified Z-score in the tranquil period and inversely 
correlated in the post-GFC period, mirroring the patterns observed in Column 4. Second, for the 
non-tradable sector none of the interacted leverage coefficients are statistically significantly 
related to the Z-score in any sub-period. Post-GFC, it appears that, conditional on leverage, the 
tradable sector is more financially vulnerable. Firm size continues to be inversely correlated with 
the Z-score for both tradable and non-tradable sectors.  
                                                 
51 We also estimated a specification with a control for the return on assets. The coefficient on firm size remains 
inversely correlated with the modified Z-score while the return on assets, a measure of profitability, is positively 
correlated with the modified Z-score. 
52 We start by classifying as non-tradable all firms that have a SIC2 code above 39, but then we also classify as non-
tradable firms with SIC2 codes 7 (Agricultural Services), 9 (Fishing, Hunting and Trapping), 15 (Construction - 
General Contractors & Operative Builders), 16 (Heavy Construction, Except Building Construction, Contractor), 17 
(Construction - Special Trade Contractors), 25 (Furniture and Fixtures), 27 (Printing, Publishing and Allied 
Industries), and 32 (Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products). This classification yields 5,888 observations in the 
tradable sector and 4,000 in the non-tradable sector. Our results are robust to using the simpler above 39 and below 
split.  
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Next, we examine the impact of the interaction of leverage and three macroeconomic 
variables - exchange rates, interest rates and GDP growth - on financial fragility. We begin with 
the exchange rate. This variable stands to play an important role because, in the presence of 
foreign currency denominated debt, the relationship between leverage and the Z-scores may vary 
with currency movements. While we do not have data on the currency composition of firm-level 
debt, the finding that currency movements amplify the correlation between leverage and 
corporate financial fragility measured by the modified Z-score would be consistent with the 
presence of currency mismatches. We test this hypothesis by estimating the following equation:  
𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑐,𝑡 + (𝛽1𝐷1 + 𝛽2𝐷2 + 𝛽3𝐷3)𝐿𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 
+(𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2 + 𝛾3𝐷3)𝐿𝑖,𝑐,𝑡∆𝐸𝑋𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡      (4) 
Here, ∆𝐸𝑋𝑐,𝑡−1 is the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate, where ∆𝐸𝑋 > 0 
represents a currency depreciation. Table 2.5 presents the results. Again, we start by estimating 
the model without including firms and country-year fixed effects. The first column’s negative, 
statistically significant coefficient on 𝛾1(AFC×EX×Leverage) suggests that, in the AFC period and 
conditional on a depreciating currency, leverage has a statistically adverse impact on the firm-
fragility score.  𝛽1 the unconditional effect of leverage on the modified Z-score during the AFC 
period is no longer statistically significant once we include the interaction of leverage and 
exchange rate changes. 
At the same time, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 , the unconditional effects of leverage on the modified Z-
score remain negative and statistically significant and 𝛾3, the effect of leverage conditional on 
currency changes in the post-GFC period is not statistically significant. This result is consistent 
with the fact that in the AFC period firms with high leverage also had currency mismatches. 
However, currency mismatches do not seem to be important in the post-GFC period, possibly 
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due to the lack of severe currency depreciations. Also, note that while Asian currencies 
experienced significant depreciations during the AFC, the post-GFC period was generally 
marked by an appreciation of emerging market currencies with the exception of the period after 
2013.  
Column 2 of Table 2.5 shows that the interaction effect between leverage and exchange 
rate change (𝛾1) holds when we introduce firm-specific factors like investment in fixed assets 
(investment) and firm size (log of total assets). Specifically, the modified Z-score continues to be 
inversely correlated with firm size, and the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Column 3 introduces firm and country-year fixed effects. It is interesting to note that once we 
include compositional controls, the only two coefficients that are statistically significant (and at 
the 1% level) are the interaction effect between leverage and exchange rate change (𝛾1) and the 
negative coefficient on firm size.  
Finally, we split the sample between firms in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. As 
before, we do not run separate regressions but interact the coefficients with tradable and non-
tradable dummies. Column 4 shows that in the AFC period the differences between firms in the 
tradable and non-tradable sectors are not apparent. The point estimates on 𝛾1, i.e., the interaction 
effect of leverage during the AFC period conditional on changes in exchange rates are virtually 
identical across the two sectors, albeit the coefficient is more precisely estimated for the non-
tradable sectors.53  Taken together, the findings are consistent with the idea that in the AFC 
period (and immediately before it) the link between leverage and corporate financial fragility 
indicates the presence of currency mismatches. Further, while, 𝛾3, the interaction effect between 
leverage and exchange rate changes in the post-GFC period, is not statistically significant for 
                                                 
53 As in Table 2.4, Columns 4a and 4b are estimated jointly.  In robustness analysis (not shown) the results are 
robust to including the periods excluded from the table (the excluded periods are 1992-95 and 1999-2002). 
 84 
either the tradable or the non-tradable sector, 𝛽3, the unconditional relationship between leverage 
and the modified Z-score continues to be negative and significant in the post-GFC period only 
for the tradable section. This pattern is similar to that observed in Table 2.6. Post-GFC leverage 
vulnerabilities appear significant for the tradable sector independent of exchange rate changes as 
well. Also note that firm size is inversely related to the modified Z-score at the 1% level of 
statistical significance in all specifications.  
One may argue that our results are driven by the fact that exchange rate movements were 
different in the two periods. In the period following the immediate aftermath of the post-GFC 
period when international capital flows began their surge towards emerging markets, many 
emerging markets experienced appreciating currencies (2010-2012) and/or relatively modest 
depreciations (2012-2014) in comparison to the massive currency depreciations in the AFC 
period. To examine whether this may be the case, we distinguish between periods of currency 
appreciation and depreciation. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑐,𝑡 + (𝛽1𝐷1 + 𝛽2𝐷2 + 𝛽3𝐷3)𝐿𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 
+(𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2 + 𝛽𝛾3𝐷3)𝐿𝑖,𝑐,𝑡∆𝐸𝑋𝑐,𝑡−1 + 
+𝐴𝑐,𝑡−1(𝜃1𝐷1 + 𝜃2𝐷2 + 𝛽𝜃3𝐷3)𝐿𝑖,𝑐,𝑡∆𝐸𝑋𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡  (5) 
where 𝐴𝑐,𝑡−1 is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if ∆𝐸𝑋𝑐,𝑡−1 < 0 (i.e., if we observe a currency 
appreciation). The specification captures the differential effects of depreciations and 
appreciations interacted with leverage on corporate financial fragility. In this set up 𝛾𝑖 measures 
the joint effect of leverage and change in the exchange rate on Z-scores conditional on a currency 
depreciation, and 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖  measures the effects conditional on an appreciation. We find 𝛾1 to be 
negative and statistically significant whereas 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 yields positive but statistically insignificant 
values (results unreported but available from the authors). This pattern corroborates the 
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hypothesis that leverage interacted with currency depreciation has a statistically significant 
adverse impact on Z-scores, our measure of corporate financial fragility in emerging markets.  
Note that the the objective of this paper is to understand how balance sheets evolve in the 
run-up to a corporate-driven crisis. With this aim in mind, we limit the pre-AFC period to 1996-
1998 as during 1994-1995 there were several emerging-market crises (e.g. Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Philippines) that could contaminate our focus on the AFC, our benchmark for periods 
of corporate fragility. However, in the appendix, we show that our regressions results are robust 
to including 1992-95 in the Asian Financial Crisis period and using this alternative definition for 
the pre-AFC period (see Tables D3 and D4).54  
An important concern is whether survivorship bias drives the observed pattern of results. 
To address this, in Table 2.6 we re-estimate the specification in Column 3 of Table 2.5 with 
firms that survive or are present in the data for different lengths of time. We limit the sample to 
firms that are present for at least five years (column 2), for at least ten years (column 3) and for 
at least fifteen years (column 4). The finding that exchange rate depreciations amplify the 
negative correlation between leverage and the modified Z-score during the AFC period is robust 
to restricting the analysis to these subsamples. Interestingly, the correlation rises in magnitude as 
we proceed from a sample with a fewer number of years in Column 2 to a sample with firms 
with data for fifteen years in Column 4.  
In emerging markets, currency depreciations are often accompanied by economic 
recessions and tighter financial conditions. The previous results could thus be driven by the fact 
that highly leveraged firms suffer more during recessions or, in the presence of maturity 
mismatches, are particularly affected by sudden increases in the interest rate. In Table 2.7, we 
                                                 
54 Appendix Table D5 also shows the result to be robust to the exclusion of China. 
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take these underlying macro fundamentals into account by further interacting our three period 
dummies (AFC, tranquil, and GFC) with lagged GDP growth and the deposit rate (we would 
have preferred a lending rate but faced data constraints).   
The main results from the Tables 2.5 and 2.6 on the adverse impact of leverage 
conditional on currency depreciations (𝛾1) on Z-scores during the AFC period remain 
unchanged. Column 1 includes lagged real GDP growth as a control and suggests that during the 
post-GFC period leverage conditional on higher real GDP growth rates is positively but not 
significantly correlated with Z-scores. It is interesting to point out that in specifications that use 
the regular Z-score as a dependent variable there is a positive and statistically significant 
correlation between leverage conditional on real GDP growth in the post-GFC period, suggesting 
that leverage in growing countries is correlated with less corporate financial vulnerability.  
Column 2 controls for leverage interacted with lagged values of the interest rate. The coefficient 
estimates on interest rates interacted with leverage are not statistically significant. Column 3 
includes both interaction effects (lagged real GDP growth and lagged interest rates). The 
interaction effect on lagged real GDP growth continues as positive and that on lagged interest 
rates remains statistically insignificant. The findings that size is inversely correlated with the 
modified Z-score while real investment is positively correlated remain robust to the inclusion of 
these additional macro controls. Note that 𝛽1, the unconditional effect of leverage on the 
modified Z-score during the AFC period, is positively and significant (Columns 1 and 3) 
suggesting that controlling for real GDP growth, firms with better prospects were able to borrow 
more during this period.  
Many emerging market countries reacted to the crises of the late 1990s with reforms 
aimed at improving their institutional and macroeconomic framework. Fourteen of the twenty-
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five countries included in our sample moved to an inflation-targeting framework between 1997 
and 2009. Many countries and also implemented reforms aimed at improving their domestic 
capital markets (the Asian Bond market Initiative was a specific outcome of the Asian Financial 
crisis) and promoting financial deepening. In our sample of countries average financial depth 
went from 50% in 1995 to 72% in 2014. The period we study was also characterized by different 
phases of financial globalization with an increase of cross-border capital flows over 2002-2007, a 
collapse over 2007-2009 and a rapid increase in flows to emerging markets after 2010 (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2017). 
In Table 2.8 we test whether our results are driven by these factors by examining the 
effects of leverage conditional on changes in the exchange rate are robust to the inclusion of an 
index of financial development, inflation targeting regimes, and the updated Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) index of financial globalization.  The adverse impact of leverage conditional on 
currency depreciations (𝛾1) on Z-scores during the AFC period remains unchanged to the 
inclusion of these additional controls. It is important to note that the inverse correlation between 
firm size and the modified Z-score is salient across all specifications.  
2.7 Corporate Fragility in Emerging Markets and the Macroeconomy 
A key question is whether the increase in corporate leverage documented above can have 
large negative macroeconomic consequences when central banks in advanced economies start 
raising their interest rates (a process already begun by the Federal Reserve). Acharya et al. 
(2015) suggest this could lead to capital outflows from emerging markets and potential problems 
associated with the presence of currency mismatches in firm balance sheets. 
Note that in all the specifications in Tables 2.4-2.8 that included firm size, size was a 
significant predictor of financial vulnerability. Moreover the coefficient was highly statistically 
significant. The inverse correlation between firm size and the Altman’s Z-score (both the 
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standard and modified versions), suggest that in emerging markets firm size or the extent of 
granularity in the firm-level data may be a novel and powerful indicator of financial 
vulnerabilities. 
We address this question by studying the behavior of large firms. Specifically, we 
proceed in two steps. First, we follow Gabaix (2011)55 and show that idiosyncratic shocks to 
large firms are significantly correlated with GDP growth in our sample of emerging markets.56 
Second, we test whether large firms are particularly vulnerable to exchange rate movements. We 
find that large firms are, on average, less leveraged than smaller firms. However, we also find 
that the more-leveraged large firms are more vulnerable to exchange rate shocks compared to 
equally-leveraged smaller firms. This evidence is consistent with the idea that large firms make a 
greater use of foreign currency borrowing and that they are not fully hedged against exchange 
rate movements. While this result holds for the average country in our sample, we also find that 
there is substantial cross-country heterogeneity. 
2.7.1 Granularity in emerging market countries 
Gabaix (2011) shows that if the distribution of firm size can be approximated with a fat-
tailed power law (formally 𝑃(𝑆 > 𝑥) = 𝑎𝑥−𝜉 where S is firm size and 𝜉 ≥ 1) idiosyncratic firm-
level shocks can play a key role in explaining aggregate fluctuations. He builds a “granularity” 
index that captures idiosyncratic shocks for the largest 100 US firms and shows that this index is 
closely correlated with overall US GDP growth.  
                                                 
55 Gabaix (2011) shows that idiosyncratic shocks to firms can generate aggregate fluctuations. An intuitive reason is 
that some firms are very large, and further that initial shocks can be intensified by a variety of generic amplification 
mechanisms. In the context of exchange rate or other shocks that can adversely impact highly levered firms, an 
additional concern is that shocks to systemically important firms in emerging markets could have feedback effects 
for the financial systems in these countries. The financial vulnerability of large firms is inextricably linked to the 
banking system in particular.   
56 Gabaix (2011) uses data for US listed firms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply his 
methodology to emerging market countries and show that the result also holds in this sample of countries.  
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According to Gabaix, granularity effects are likely to be even more important in countries 
that are less diversified than the United States. He mentions several emerging market countries 
and suggests that “It would be interesting to transpose the present analysis to those countries” 
(Gabaix, 2011 p. 737). We take this suggestion seriously and build a granularity index for our 
sample of 26 emerging market countries.  
Gabaix (2011) measures granularity with the following index:  
Γ𝑡 = ∑
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1
(𝑔𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡)
𝐾
𝑖=1      (6) 
where 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 measures sales of firm 𝑖, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 is GDP, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is the growth rate of firm 𝑖 (defined as 
the growth rate of the sales to employees ratio) and ?̅?𝑡 is the simple average of the growth rate of 
the largest 𝑄 firms in the economy (with 𝑄 ≥ 𝐾, and where firm size is measured by sales). 
Gabaix sets K=100 and experiments with Q=100 and Q=1000. When Q=100, the index is equal 
to the weighted growth rate of the 100 largest firms minus the (simple) average growth rate of 
these same firms. When Q=1000, the index is equal to the weighted growth rate of the 100 
largest firms minus the (simple) average growth rate of the largest 1000 firms. It should be noted 
that the weights (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1
) do not add up to one because the weights are computed for a subset of 
firms and the numerator is sales and the denominator is GDP. 
In order to build a granularity index for our sample of emerging markets we need to 
address two issues. The first issue relates to data limitations. As mentioned above, Gabaix 
measures firm growth as the growth rate of the sales-to-employees ratio. Unfortunately, we do 
not have a good coverage of firms with data on total employment. Therefore, we measure firm 
growth by focusing on the growth rate of total sales. Our measure is a good approximation of the 
sales to employees growth rate as long as most of the variance in the ratio used by Gabaix arises 
from variations in sales rather than in variations of employment. 
 90 
The second issue relates to the definition of “large” firms in an emerging market context. 
While it is reasonable to assume that, in a large and diversified economy like the United States, 
the largest 100 firms are indeed very large, this assumption is problematic in smaller and less 
diversified emerging market countries.  
One possible way to address this issue is to simply use a smaller number of firms for all 
countries in our sample. In choosing this number however the number of firms needs to be large 
enough to capture some variability in idiosyncratic shocks and cover a meaningful share of 
overall GDP. Among the various possible thresholds, the largest number that allows us to include 
all the countries in our sample is 25.57 
An alternative strategy is to use a criterion based on the share of total sales over GDP. 
For instance, we can rank firms in descending order of size and impose a cumulative sales-to-
GDP ratio threshold.58 Formally, let 𝑓1,𝑐,𝑡 be total sales of the largest firm (by sales) in country c, 
year, t, 𝑓2,𝑐,𝑡, the sales of the second largest and 𝑓𝑛,𝑐,𝑡 the sales of the n
th largest firm. Let x be a 
threshold in terms of cumulated sales of over GDP. Then firm are defined as large up to the point 
where:  
∑
𝑓𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 < 𝑥      (7) 
We experimented, with different thresholds and found that most country-years in our 
sample reach the level of 20% of the cumulative sales-to-GDP ratio.  One issue is that in 
                                                 
57 Note that country heterogeneity poses a challenge. 25 firms are likely to capture a large share of the economy in a 
relatively small country like Peru, but twill capture a much smaller share of the economy in a larger country like 
Brazil or China.  
58 As before there are tradeoffs in the choice of the threshold, x. If the threshold is too low there will be too few 
“large” firms and if the threshold is too high there will be many countries in our sample with few listed firms that do 
not reach a higher threshold. 
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countries with high degrees of concentration, a very small number of firms are sufficient to 
breach the threshold.  
In the end, we adopt an intermediate strategy: we define as large, the largest firms for 
whom cumulative sales are below 20 percent of GDP. However, if less than 25 firms are 
sufficient to reach this threshold, our definition of large is the largest 25 firms. As we do not 
want to include more firms than what Gabaix includes for the US, we limit the number of large 
firms to 100. Summing up, we rank firms by sales and we define as large a firm 𝑓𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 if 𝑖 ≤ 25 or  
∑
𝑓𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 < 0.2, and 𝑖 ≤ 100.
59 Table 2.9 replicates Gabaix’s results and shows that granularity 
is positively correlated to GDP growth in our sample of emerging market countries. 
2.7.2 Large Firms and Exchange Rate Vulnerabilities 
Having established that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms are correlated with GDP 
growth, we now examine whether leveraged large firms are more vulnerable to currency 
depreciations. As a first step, we check if there are differences in leverage and other potential 
measures of fragility between large and smaller firms.  Column 1 of Table 2.10 shows that 
compared to smaller firms, lower levels of leverage characterize the large firms in the sample. 
Columns 2-4 show that there are no statistically significant differences in other measures of 
corporate financial vulnerabilities such as solvency, liquidity, and the Z-score.  
While large firms have lower leverage with respect to smaller firms, it is possible that 
they have an “unhealthier” type of leverage. Specifically, in the presence of fixed costs it is 
easier for large firms to borrow abroad and foreign borrowing tends to be in foreign currency. 
There is evidence that large firms issue international bonds not only to finance investment 
                                                 
59 The results are robust to defining as large the largest 25 firms without taking into consideration the cumulative 
sales-to-GDP ratio. 
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projects but also to engage into carry trade activities (Bruno and Shin, 2016, Caballero, Panizza, 
and Powell, 2015). Lack of data on the currency composition of firm liabilities prevents us from 
directly testing if this is the case for our full sample of countries, but there is some evidence that 
(i) large Brazilian firms are more likely to have foreign currency debt compared to smaller firms 
(Bonomo et al.2003); (ii) large firms in US use more foreign currency derivatives (Allayannis 
and Weston, 2001); (iii) large firms in Finland are more likely to borrow in foreign currencies 
than small firms (Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001); and larger firms hold a higher fraction of 
dollar debt in a set of firms from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico (Bleakley and 
Cowan, 2005). 
Given that we cannot test directly whether currency mismatches are potentially more 
problematic for larger firms, we test whether sales growth (associated with GDP growth in the 
granularity regressions of Table 2.9) responds more to exchange rate movements in large and 
leveraged firms than in equally leveraged smaller firms. As a first step we estimate the following 
model for our full sample of firms: 
𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑡(𝛽 + 𝛾𝐷𝑋𝑅𝑐𝑡) + 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐷𝑋𝑅𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑡,𝑡   (8) 
where 𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is sales growth in firm 𝑖, country 𝑐, year 𝑡, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑡  is leverage, 𝐷𝑋𝑅𝑐𝑡 is the 
percentage change in the exchange rate in country 𝑐, year 𝑡 (positive values are depreciations), 
𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for large firms (defined as above), and 
𝛼𝑖 are firm fixed effects.  
Column 1 of Table 2.11 shows that currency depreciations and leverage are negatively 
correlated with sales growth, but that the interaction between leverage and sales growth is not 
statistically significant. The lack of a significant effect on the interaction between leverage and 
currency depreciations may be due to the fact that for the average firm in our sample the negative 
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effect of depreciation is not linked to the presence of negative balance sheet effects brought 
about by the presence of foreign currency debt. Alternatively, the lack of statistical significance 
may be due to the fact that firms that have currency mismatches are less leveraged on average. 
As we saw earlier, large firms are less leveraged and may have larger shares of foreign currency 
debt.  When we augment the model with country-year fixed effects (a specification that does not 
allow us to separately estimate the effect of the exchange rate change, DXR), we find results that 
are essentially identical to those of the model without country-year fixed effects (compare the 
first two columns of Table 2.11).  
Next, we estimate our model with country-year fixed effects separately for large and 
small firms. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.11 show that leverage and the interaction between 
leverage and exchange rate movements are statistically significant for large firms and are not 
statistically significant for smaller firms. There are also large differences in the coefficients. The 
leverage coefficient is three times larger in the large firms subsample and the interaction between 
leverage and DXR is ten times larger in the large firms subsample. The point estimates imply 
that in large firms, a 30% depreciation of the exchange rate (DXR=0.3) yields correlations 
between leverage and sales growth ranging from -0.045 to -0.195.  
In column 3 of Table 2.11, we find that the interactive coefficient takes a value of -0.5. 
This means that, all else equal, a 30% depreciation (the average in our sample) reduces sales for 
the large firm with average leverage (the average for large firms is 65% in our sample) by 
approximately (10% 65*0.3*0.5=9.75%). Assume that these large firms have sales that amount 
to 50% of GDP. The granularity regressions of Table 2.9 (column 1) say that if there is a 1% 
shock to sales of the largest firms with total sales accounting for 50% of GDP, GDP growth will 
decrease by 0.35 percentage points (0.698/2). These back-of-the-envelope calculations imply that 
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the GDP growth effects of a 30% depreciation will be a decrease in growth of 3.5 percentage 
points. 
In column 4, we pool all our observations but allow for the differential effect of firm size 
by estimating the following model: 
𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑡(𝛽 + 𝛾𝐷𝑋𝑅𝑐𝑡 + 𝜙𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜓𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 × 𝐷𝑋𝑅𝑐𝑡) + 
+𝛿𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑐,𝑡(𝛿 + 𝜆𝐷𝑋𝑅𝑐𝑡) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜒𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐𝑡,𝑡   (9) 
where 𝜒𝑐,𝑡 is a country-year fixed effect and all other variables are defined as above. In this case 
our parameter of interest is 𝜓, which captures how firm size affects the impact on sales of the 
interaction between depreciation and leverage. The results are in Column 5 of Table 2.11. We 
find that 𝜓 is negative, large in absolute value, and statistically significant. This confirms that the 
interaction between leverage and currency depreciations in absolute value is significantly larger 
for large firms. We also find that  𝜆  is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that large 
firms are negatively impacted by currency depreciations even in the absence of leverage.  
Given that our panel is highly unbalanced with some countries in the sample with more 
than 400 listed firms while others with only 20 listed firms, we re-estimate our model by keeping 
a maximum of 150 firms per country-year. The results remain near identical to what we obtain 
for the full sample of firms (compare columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.11). 
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that many large firms may have unhedged 
foreign currency liabilities and are thus vulnerable to sudden currency depreciations. Given our 
previous evidence that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms affect overall economic activity, one is 
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tempted to conclude that a sudden capital flows reversal could lead to very adverse effects on 
real output in emerging markets.60  
Such a pessimistic conclusion is however mitigated by the fact that, while the results of 
Table 2.11 are valid for the average emerging market country, there is substantial heterogeneity 
among the countries included in our sample. Figure 2.7 reports the point estimates of the 
parameter 𝜓 obtained by estimating Equation 9 (without the country-year fixed effects) 
separately for 16 countries in our sample. 61 The point estimates range between -1 (Pakistan) and 
2.5 (Russia). They are negative for 10 countries (statistically significant for 5 countries) and 
positive for 6 countries (statistically significant for one country). Thus, there is substantial cross-
country heterogeneity and one challenge for future research will be to identify the drivers of this 
heterogeneity.    
2.8 Conclusion 
This paper addresses widespread concerns about and potential macroeconomic 
repercussions of the rapid increase in corporate leverage in emerging markets following the 
GFC. Stylized facts using firm-level data show that post-GFC, emerging market corporate 
balance sheet indicators have not deteriorated to AFC crisis-country levels. However, more 
countries are close to or in the “vulnerable” range of Altman’s Z-score (in the “grey zone” or 
barely above the threshold) and average leverage for the entire emerging market sample is higher 
in the post-GFC sub period than during the AFC. Significantly, we find that the relationships 
between leverage, exchange rate depreciations, and corporate financial distress scores are time 
                                                 
60 Please note that all the results are robust to interacting leverage and firm size with financial debt and a measure of 
financial globalization. 
61 For the remaining countries in our sample, there was not enough information in the data to estimate country-
specific coefficients.  
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varying. Also, a central finding is that firm size is inversely correlated with corporate distress 
scores and, further, that currency depreciations amplify the impact of leverage on financial 
vulnerability for large firms during a crisis.  
Therefore the question arises whether the corporate financial health of large firms is more 
important for the macroeconomy than others. Following Gabaix (2011), we find that at a 
granular level, the sales growth of large firms is a systemically important driver of economic 
growth. Large firms, therefore, have the potential to transmit corporate distress to other firms in 
emerging markets via network effects and other spillovers, warranting special attention from 
policymakers. Although large firms in our sample consistently have less leverage, the sales 
growth of these firms is more adversely impacted by exchange rate depreciations compared to 
similarly levered smaller firms, albeit with substantial cross-country heterogeneity in the 
observed impacts. 
The AFC had corporate financial roots. In particular, increased leverage on firm balance 
sheets in conjunction with foreign exchange denominated debt made firms vulnerable to the 
currency devaluations that accompanied the crisis. Currency and maturity mismatches led to 
widespread firm failures, while implicit bailout guarantees created moral hazard issues related to 
the increased leverage. Credit to emerging market firms has witnessed an unprecedented and 
rapid growth since the GFC. Given the systemic importance of large and highly levered firms, 
our results suggest that policymakers closely monitor this subset of emerging market firms. 
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2.9 Tables and Figures 
 
Source: authors calculations based on BIS total credit statistics. (Decomposition across sectors is only available after 
2006) 
Figure 2.1: Total Credit to the Non-Financial Sector in Emerging Markets (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
Source: authors calculations based on BIS total credit statistics  
Figure 2.2: Total Credit to the Non-Financial Sector in Emerging Markets (% of GDP) 
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Source: authors calculations based on Worldscope data. 
Figure 2.3: Leverage – Debt to Equity (Weighted Mean) 
 
 
 
Source: authors calculations based on Worldscope data. 
Figure 2.4: Liquidity – Current to Total Liabilities (Weighted Mean) 
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Source: authors calculations based on Worldscope data. 
Figure 2.5: Solvency – EBITDA to Total Liabilities (Weighted Mean) 
 
 
 
Source: authors calculations based on Worldscope data. 
Figure 2.6: Altman Z''-Score EM (Weighted Mean) 
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Notes: The figure plots the equation the coefficient (with a 95% Confidence Interval) of the Parameter 𝜓 of X4 
(Without the country-year fixed effects) estimate one country at a time. 
Figure 2.7: Coefficient of the Parameter 𝝍 
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Table 2.2: Total Claims on Emerging Market Countries, BIS reporting Banks (billion 
USD) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015Q3 
Emerging Markets 
Total      2,419       2,408       2,396       2,807       3,032       3,157       3,640       3,699       3,471  
% top 5 curr. 81% 83% 81% 79% 79% 77% 77% 71% 74% 
% USD 52% 53% 52% 53% 55% 53% 54% 55% 58% 
Emerging Markets Ex-China 
Total      2,231       2,254       2,219       2,476       2,555       2,634       2,740       2,663       2,594  
% top 5 curr. 82% 84% 81% 80% 81% 79% 81% 81% 82% 
% USD 52% 53% 52% 53% 56% 55% 58% 61% 63% 
Asia 
Total         830          738          783       1,064       1,258       1,349       1,801       1,945       1,752  
% Total EM 34% 31% 33% 38% 41% 43% 49% 53% 50% 
% top 5 curr. 78% 84% 80% 79% 79% 77% 74% 62% 65% 
% USD 56% 58% 59% 59% 59% 56% 56% 53% 56% 
Asia Ex-China 
Total         641          584          606          733          782          826          901          908          874  
% Total EM 26% 24% 25% 26% 26% 26% 25% 25% 25% 
% top 5 curr. 81% 86% 84% 82% 85% 83% 84% 82% 83% 
% USD 57% 59% 60% 61% 66% 64% 67% 69% 71% 
Latin America 
Total         403          410          413          533          602          626          647          633          627  
% Total EM 17% 17% 17% 19% 20% 20% 18% 17% 18% 
% top 5 curr. 83% 84% 76% 76% 78% 78% 79% 82% 85% 
% USD 70% 74% 67% 67% 70% 70% 71% 75% 79% 
Developing Europe 
Total         728          786          722          711          690          698          713          609          559  
% Total EM 30% 33% 30% 25% 23% 22% 20% 16% 16% 
% top 5 curr. 79% 81% 80% 76% 76% 73% 77% 77% 77% 
% USD 35% 33% 29% 28% 29% 27% 31% 32% 31% 
Africa and Middle East 
Total         459          474          478          499          481          484          479          513          533  
% Total EM 19% 20% 20% 18% 16% 15% 13% 14% 15% 
% top 5 curr. 87% 84% 85% 84% 86% 83% 84% 83% 84% 
% USD 58% 60% 62% 61% 63% 61% 61% 63% 65% 
Source: Own elaborations based on BIS Locational Statistics. The data are for total claims (all instruments and all 
sectors) on residents of counterparty countries. Top five currencies are USD, euro, yen, British pound, and, Swiss 
franc. 
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Table 2.3: Asian Financial Crisis vs Post-Global Financial Crisis 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Countries 
Asian 
Financial 
Crisis (1996-
1998) 
Post-Global 
Financial 
Crisis  
(2008-14) 
 
Post-GFC > 
AFC 
 (By 
country) 
Post-GFC > 
Asian Five 
AFC avg. 
Post-
GFC > 
EM AFC 
avg. 
 Panel A: Leverage (Debt to Equity)  
Asian Crisis Five 145.5% 73.9% Yes 10 0 12 
Emerging Markets 80.8% 87.3% No 8 21 9 
 
Panel B: Liquidity (Current to Total Liabilities) 
Asian Crisis Five 57.6% 59.5% Yes 6 11 11 
Emerging Markets 58.7% 56.4% No 12 11 11 
  Panel C: Solvency (Coverage ratio: EBITDA to Total Liabilities) 
Asian Crisis Five 23.7% 48.3% Yes 9 20 9 
Emerging Markets 34.9% 35.7% No 9 2 13 
 Panel D: Profitability (Return on Invested Capital) 
Asian Crisis Five 7.3% 11.0% Yes 9 17 9 
Emerging Markets 10.9% 10.7% No 9 5 13 
 
Panel E: Emerging-Markets Z-score (Distance to Default) 
Asian Crisis Five 5.2 6.6 Yes 9 20 13 
Emerging Markets 6.1 6.2 No 9 2 9 
Leverage is measured by the debt to equity ratio: a firm's total debt divided by its common equity. Liquidity is 
measured by current-to-total liabilities. Solvency is measured by the coverage ratio: earnings before interest, taxes, 
and depreciation divided by total liabilities. Profitability is measured by the return on invested capital (ROIC): the 
ratio of operating profit (earnings before interest and tax) to invested capital (sum of shareholders' equity and debt 
liabilities). Altman's (2005) Emerging Market Z-Score measures the inverse of firm fragility (computation described 
in the text). The first two columns present the average measure for each group of countries during our two fragile 
periods: The Asian Financial Crisis (1996-1998) and the post-Global Financial Crisis (2008-2014). The last three 
columns count the number of countries in our sample that meet (“Yes”) and don’t meet (“No”) the conditions stated 
in the column headings. The data is weighted by sales by year and then averaged per period per country. Asian 
Crisis Five countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Source: authors 
calculations based on Worldscope data. 
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Table 2.4: The Relationship Between Leverage and Distance to Default in Different Time 
Periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dep Var: 
Altman  
Z-score 
Dep Var: Modified Altman Z score 
   (5a) 
Tradable 
(5b) 
Non-Tradable 
𝛽1 (AFC×Leverage) -2.666*** -0.389** -0.225 -0.252 -0.233 -0.270 
 (0.229) (0.179) (0.201) (0.259) (0.332) (0.338) 
𝛽2 (Tranquil×Leverage) -3.024*** -0.711*** -0.512*** 0.386* 0.495* 0.281 
 (0.196) (0.153) (0.171) (0.219) (0.280) (0.297) 
𝛽3 (GFC×Leverage) -2.908*** -0.573*** -0.522*** -0.236 -0.526** 0.177 
 (0.183) (0.143) (0.157) (0.201) (0.249) (0.289) 
Investment   0.066 0.0432 0.769 0.0413 
   (0.041) (0.0392) (0.623) (0.0393) 
Firm Size   -0.053*** -1.632*** -1.650*** -1.613*** 
   (0.012) (0.0731) (0.0973) (0.111) 
Constant -2.666*** -0.389** 28.55***    
 (0.229) (0.179) (0.203)    
Observations 9,257 9,257 8,015 6,495 6,495 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 0.358 0.322 0.287 -0.638**   
P value 0.20 0.13 0.23 0.04   
𝛽3 − 𝛽2 0.115 0.138 -0.01 -0.622**   
P value 0.62 0.44 0.96 0.02   
𝛽1 − 𝛽3 0.242 0.185 0.297 -0.016   
P value 0.36 0.37 0.19 0.96   
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
Country-year fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes Yes 
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default (the 
regular Z-score in column 1 and the modified Z-score in columns 2-5), and the explanatory variables are the 
interactions between leverage and each of three dummy variables taking a value of one for the Asian Financial 
Crisis (1996-1998), tranquil period (2003-2007), and post-Global Financial Crisis (2008-2014), respectively. In 
column 5 the variables are further interacted with a dummy taking a value of one for firms that operate in tradable 
sectors (column 5a) and non-tradable sectors (column 5b). In columns 3-5, the model is augmented with a set of 
firm-specific controls measuring investment and size proxied by the log of total assets. The last two rows display 
whether a specification includes country-year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-
level in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.5: Distance to Default, Leverage, and the Exchange Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dep Var: Modified Altman Z score 
 
   (5a) 
Tradable 
(5b) 
Non-Tradable 
𝛽1 (AFC×Leverage) -0.225 0.0239 0.245 -0.225 0.336 0.159 
 (0.198) (0.227) (0.349) (0.198) (0.446) (0.468) 
𝛽2 (Tranquil×Leverage) -0.731*** -0.550*** 0.340 -0.731*** 0.425 0.267 
 (0.154) (0.173) (0.262) (0.154) (0.319) (0.373) 
𝛽3 (GFC×Leverage) -0.596*** -0.522*** -0.234 -0.596*** -0.499* 0.134 
 (0.146) (0.160) (0.237) (0.146) (0.296) (0.348) 
𝛾1 (AFC×EX×Leverage) -1.747* -2.333** -4.800*** -1.747* -4.881*** -4.822*** 
 (0.909) (0.980) (1.402) (0.909) (1.848) (1.619) 
𝛾2 (Tranquil×EX×Leverage) -1.586 -2.699* -3.131 -1.586 -2.440 0.263 
 (1.529) (1.632) (1.907) (1.529) (2.031) (2.509) 
𝛾3 (GFC×EX×Leverage) 1.236 0.336 0.402 1.236 -0.523 1.880 
 (1.468) (1.604) (2.683) (1.468) (3.099) (3.907) 
Investment  0.064 0.042  0.789 0.043 
  (0.041) (0.027)  (0.511) (0.029) 
Firm Size  -0.056*** -1.632***  -1.649*** -1.611*** 
  (0.012) (0.089)  (0.120) (0.134) 
Constant 27.64*** 28.59***  27.64***   
 (0.0475) (0.204)  (0.0475)   
Observations 9,257 7,351 6,495 9,257 6,495 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country-year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default (the 
modified Z-score), and the explanatory variables are the interactions between leverage and each of three dummy 
variables taking a value of one for the Asian Financial Crisis (1996-1998), tranquil period (2003-2007), and post-
Global Financial Crisis (2008-2014), respectively. These variables are then further interacted with the percentage 
change in the nominal exchange rate (lagged one period).  In columns 2, 3 and 5, the model is augmented with a set 
of firm-specific controls measuring investment and size proxied by the log of total assets. The last two columns (5a 
and 5b) estimate separate effects for firms in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The last two rows display 
whether a specification includes country-year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-
level in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.6: Firms that Remain in the Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep Var: Modified Altman Z score 
𝛽1 (AFC×Leverage) 0.245 0.191 0.519 0.485 
 (0.349) (0.352) (0.406) (0.457) 
𝛽2 (Tranquil×Leverage ) 0.340 0.377 0.417 0.393 
 (0.262) (0.263) (0.329) (0.477) 
𝛽3 (GFC×Leverage) -0.234 -0.164 -0.286 0.146 
 (0.237) (0.239) (0.296) (0.439) 
𝛾1 (AF×EX×Leverage) -4.800*** -4.803*** -5.751*** -7.002** 
 (1.402) (1.395) (1.750) (2.696) 
𝛾2 (Tranquil×EX×Leverage) -3.131 -2.986 -4.153* -4.870 
 (1.907) (1.925) (2.230) (3.596) 
𝛾3 (GF×EX×Leverage) 0.402 0.604 0.830 -0.358 
 (2.683) (2.690) (3.206) (4.190) 
Investment 0.042 0.0444* -0.317* 0.431 
 (0.027) (0.0259) (0.192) (0.712) 
Size -1.632*** -1.597*** -1.665*** -1.941*** 
 (0.089) (0.091) (0.113) (0.172) 
Observations 6,495 6,473 3,940 1,929 
Sample All At least 5 years At least 10 years At least 15 years 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
This table shows the specification in Table 2.5, column 3 on samples that include firms present for different number 
of years in the sample. Column 1 uses the entire sample, while columns 2-4 limit the sample to firms with at least 5, 
10, and 15 years of data, respectively. The dependent variable is distance to default (the modified Z-score), and the 
explanatory variables are the interactions between leverage and each of three dummy variables taking a value of one 
for the Asian Financial Crisis (1996-1998), tranquil period (2003-2007), and post-Global Financial Crisis (2008-
2014), respectively. These variables are then further interacted with the percentage change in the nominal exchange 
rate (lagged one period).  The model is augmented with a set of firm-specific controls measuring investment and size 
proxied by the log of total assets. All specifications control for country-year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm-level in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.7: Leverage, Distance to Default, Interest Rate, and Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dep Var: Modified Altman Z score 
𝛽1 (AFC×Leverage) 1.566** 0.736 1.346** 
 (0.611) (0.580) (0.590) 
𝛽2 (Tranquil×Leverage) 0.163 0.288 0.108 
 (0.499) (0.382) (0.530) 
𝛽3 (GFC×Leverage) -0.275 -0.260 -0.308 
 (0.368) (0.436) (0.440) 
𝛾1 (AFC*EX) -3.521** -4.181** -4.472*** 
 (1.634) (1.731) (1.707) 
𝛾2 (Tranquil*EX) -3.407 -3.172 -3.522 
 (3.002) (3.070) (3.081) 
𝛾3 (GFC*EX) -0.0931 -0.317 -0.145 
 (2.738) (2.764) (2.797) 
AFC*GR 21.33  32.46 
 (19.887)  (28.34) 
Tranquil*GR 4.287  3.779 
 (7.940)  (8.198) 
GFC*GR 2.144  1.999 
 (5.431)  (6.941) 
AFC*IR  -3.933 7.445 
  (4.144) (7.873) 
Tranquil*IR  1.652 1.194 
  (4.123) (4.210) 
GFC*IR  1.877 0.742 
  (7.208) (9.052) 
Investment 0.0434* 0.0443* 0.0436* 
 (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0260) 
Firm Size -1.613*** -1.609*** -1.615*** 
 (0.0892) (0.0892) (0.0894) 
Observations 6,334 6,334 6,334 
Sample All All All 
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-FE Yes Yes Yes 
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default (the 
modified Z-score), and the explanatory variables are the interactions between leverage and each of three dummy 
variables taking a value of one for the Asian Financial Crisis (1996-1998), tranquil period (2003-2007), and post-
Global Financial Crisis (2008-2014), respectively. These variables are then further interacted with the percentage 
change in the nominal exchange rate (lagged one period), the local interest rate (IR is the deposit rate), and lagged 
GDP growth (GR).  The model is augmented with a set of firm-specific controls measuring investment and size 
proxied by the log of total assets. All regressions control for country-year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm-level in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.8: Leverage, Distance to Default, and Macro/Institutional Framework 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep Var: Modified Altman Z score 
𝛽1 (AFC×Leverage) 0.331 0.247 0.457 0.549 
 (0.622) (0.349) (0.781) (0.801) 
𝛽2 (Tranquil×Leverage) 0.492 0.240 -0.239 -0.331 
 (0.528) (0.455) (0.826) (1.021) 
𝛽3 (GFC×Leverage) -0.505 -0.440 -1.517* -1.287 
 (0.475) (0.393) (0.773) (0.788) 
𝛾1 (AFC*EX) -4.865*** -4.804*** -4.842*** -5.077*** 
 (1.481) (1.403) (1.361) (1.473) 
𝛾2 (Tranquil*EX) -1.422 -3.082 -1.517 -2.083 
 (1.994) (1.902) (2.064) (2.221) 
𝛾3 (GFC*EX) 0.604 0.377 -3.626 -3.486 
 (2.679) (2.689) (2.917) (2.920) 
AFC*FINDEV -0.001   -0.004 
 (0.006)   (0.009) 
TRANQ*FINDEV -0.002   -0.005 
 (0.006)   (0.007) 
GFC*FINDEV 0.003   -0.004 
 (0.005)   (0.008) 
AFC*IT  -  - 
  0.158  0.255 
TRANQ*IT  (0.541)  (0.584) 
  0.299  -0.338 
GFC*IT  (0.465)  (0.584) 
   -0.244 -0.0398 
AFC*LMF   (0.769) (0.963) 
   0.426 0.677 
TRANQ*LMF   (0.618) (0.698) 
   0.889* 1.109* 
GFC*LMF   -0.489 -0.229 
   (0.712) (0.920) 
Investment 0.042 0.042 0.082*** 0.081*** 
 (0.02) (0.027) (0.011) (0.01) 
Firm Size -1.630*** -1.630*** -1.619*** -1.618*** 
 (0.0890) (0.0889) (0.108) (0.108) 
Observations 6,473 6,473 4,971 4,971 
Sample All All All All 
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default (the 
modified Z-score), and the explanatory variables are the interactions between leverage and each of three dummy 
variables taking a value of one for the Asian Financial Crisis (1996-1998), tranquil period (2003-2007), and post-
Global Financial Crisis (2008-2014), respectively. These variables are then further interacted with an index of 
financial development, inflation targeting regimes, and the updated Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) index of 
financial globalization.  The model is augmented with a set of firm-specific controls measuring investment and size 
(proxied by the log of total assets). All regressions control for country-year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm-level in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.9: The Granularity Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
G 0.698** 0.819*** 0.810** 
 (0.262) (0.293) (0.310) 
L.G  0.527** 0.509* 
  (0.236) (0.258) 
L2.G   -0.0739 
   (0.365) 
Observations 486 486 486 
Number of countries 26 26 26 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1994-2014 1994-2014 1994-2014 
This table reports a set of regression in which the dependent variable is per-capita GDP growth and the explanatory 
variables are granularity (G) and its first two lag (L.G and L2.G). All the regressions control for country and year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis.   
 
 
Table 2.10: Fragility and Firm Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Leverage Solvency Liquidity Distance to default 
Large -25.15*** 1.737 0.392 -68.66 
 (7.849) (1.648) (0.944) (42.46) 
Observations 45,104 38,741 39,271 16,687 
Sample All All All All 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports a set of regression in which the dependent variables are various measures of potential or realized 
fragility (leverage, solvency, liquidity, and distance to default) and the explanatory variable is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 for large firms (Large). All the regressions control for country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis.   
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Table 2.11: Leverage, Depreciation and Firm Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LEV -0.0115* -0.0119* -0.0350** -0.0108 -0.00824 -0.0290 
 (0.00674) (0.00709) (0.0139) (0.00865) (0.00776) (0.0404) 
DXR _LEV -0.0553 -0.0593 -0.500** -0.0448 -0.0474 -0.0520 
 (0.0495) (0.0510) (0.198) (0.0571) (0.0501) (0.0533) 
Large -209.0*** -284.5***   -285.0*** -316.5*** 
 (19.20) (24.70)   (24.70) (27.94) 
DXR 0.543      
 (4.742)      
DXR _LARGE     -35.14** -32.46* 
     (17.73) (17.89) 
LARGE_LEV     -0.0316* -0.0113 
     (0.0182) (0.0466) 
LARGE_LEV_DXR     -0.417** -0.416** 
     (0.201) (0.203) 
Observations 42,542 42,542 9,959 32,583 42,542 22,228 
Number of firms 7,441 7,441 2,956 6,046 7,441 4,990 
Sample All All Large 
Firms 
Other All Largest 
150 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CY FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
This table reports a set of regression in which the dependent variable is sales growth and the explanatory variables 
are leverage, change in in the exchange rate, firm size and the interactions among these variables. All the regressions 
control for year fixed effects, and specifications 2-6 control also for country fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level in parenthesis.   
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE AND FACTOR DEFINITIONS 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
Excess returns Log (1 + firm returns) - log (1 + country (market) index returns). 
Stock price Log price per share. 
Volatility of returns Standard deviation of daily returns over the previous month. 
Market capitalization Log (Firm market cap) - log (country market cap). The market 
capitalization of listed domestic companies comes from the World Bank.  
Profitability Ratio of net income to the market value of total assets, where the market 
value of assets is equal to the sum of the firm’s market capitalization and 
total liabilities. 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets. 
Cash Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the market value of total assets. 
Market-to-book ratio Ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity, where book value 
of equity is total assets minus total liabilities. Following Campbell et al. 
(2008), if a firm has a negative book value of equity, we set its book value 
of equity equal to $1 in order to place that firm’s market-to-book ratio in 
the right-hand side of the distribution (Large positive MB instead of a 
negative MB). 
 
 
 
 
ΔFX Monthly percentage change in the exchange rate between the local 
currency and the US dollar, quoted as local currency units per dollar and 
retrieved from Bloomberg. 
 
5-year Treasury rate Interest rate on US 5-year Treasury notes. 
VIX CBOE Volatility Index. 
Fed funds rate Federal Funds Rate, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. 
TED spread Component of the TED spread orthogonal to VIX. The TED spread is the 
spread between 3-month LIBOR RATES and 3-month T-bill rates, often 
used as a measure of liquidity risk in bond markets. Due to collinearity 
between VIX and the TED spread, we regress the TED spread on the VIX 
and keep the residual. 
 
 
 
Sources: Default data and all accounting and market variables come from the CRI database, 
the Credit Research Initiative of the National University of Singapore, accessed on December 
1, 2016. 
 
Six Factors: 
 
We compute three factors following Fama and French (1993). The Market 
factor, RM, is the return on the market minus the risk-free rate. To account for the 
various countries in our sample we construct a weighted average of returns of the main 
index in each country, where the weights are based on the number of stocks from each 
country in our sample. The Fed Funds rate serves as proxy for the risk-free rate. 
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The other two factors are Size and Book-to-Market. Each January, we sort all 
stocks by market capitalization and divide the sample in two groups of equal size: Small 
and Big. We also sort all firms by book-to-market and use the 30th and 70th percentiles 
to divide the cross-section into three groups: Low, Neutral, and High. We then 
construct 6 portfolios from the intersection of the two sorting results and compute their 
simple monthly average returns: SL, SN, SH, BL, BN, and BH. Lastly, we find the 
returns of portfolios mimicking the Size (Small-Minus-Big, or SMB) and Book-to-
Market (High-Minus-Low, or HML) factors as in Fama and French (1993): 
 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 =  
1
3
(𝑆𝐿 + 𝑆𝑁 + 𝑆𝐻) −
1
3
(𝐵𝐿 + 𝐵𝑁 + 𝐵𝐻) 
 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 =  
1
2
(𝑆𝐻 + 𝐵𝐻) −
1
2
(𝑆𝐿 + 𝐵𝐿) 
 
We rebalance the portfolios every January and end up with a monthly time series of 
returns for each factor-mimicking portfolio. 
 
The other three factors are Momentum, Short-term Reversal, and Long-term Reversal, 
computed as follows: 
 
• Momentum   Return in prior year excluding prior month 
 
• Short-term reversal   Return in prior month 
 
• Long-term reversal   Return in prior five years excluding prior year 
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APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 1 ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table B1: Number of Defaults and Observations per Year 
 
 
Year Firm-Months Defaults % 
1995 16 0 0 
1996 370 0 0 
1997 692 0 0 
1998 1,725 5 0.29 
1999 2,561 8 0.31 
2000 5,808 6 0.10 
2001 7,688 5 0.07 
2002 15,406 15 0.10 
2003 23,829 19 0.08 
2004 30,882 67 0.22 
2005 33,640 55 0.16 
2006 35,724 46 0.13 
2007 40,844 42 0.10 
2008 43,601 47 0.11 
2009 45,812 54 0.12 
2010 50,627 52 0.10 
2011 60,405 18 0.03 
2012 58,599 47 0.08 
2013 72,280 58 0.08 
2014 72,730 25 0.03 
2015 68,523 21 0.03 
Total 671,762 590 0.09     
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Table B2: Number of Observations per Country and Year 
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1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 . . 16 
1996 . . . . . . . . . . 123 . . . . . . 247 . . 370 
1997 27 . 8 . . . . . . . 225 . . . . . . 417 15 . 692 
1998 42 . 324 . . . . . . . 255 . . . . . . 1072 32 . 1725 
1999 61 . 459 . . . . . . 173 265 . . 129 . 12 . 1384 78 . 2561 
2000 165 373 492 . . . . . 33 1817 431 . . 225 57 36 6 1363 810 . 5808 
2001 182 457 472 . . . . . 308 2270 468 . . 218 301 45 23 1642 1302 . 7688 
2002 124 493 442 . . 15 15 . 454 2469 448 . 7 223 402 57 7077 1806 1374 . 15406 
2003 97 553 441 4933 . 43 30 27 513 2447 455 . 8 235 438 74 10204 2001 1330 . 23829 
2004 166 609 448 7720 . 94 94 12 732 4761 507 . 21 217 913 67 11057 2122 1342 . 30882 
2005 304 709 621 7846 104 130 136 15 869 5556 483 12 159 244 1316 57 11273 2130 1676 . 33640 
2006 359 803 921 7539 119 109 131 18 948 6099 525 195 217 265 1469 54 11620 2296 2037 . 35724 
2007 422 1188 992 9682 115 76 116 42 1206 6492 559 675 307 320 1732 58 12341 2470 2051 . 40844 
2008 401 1350 1084 10647 131 76 129 78 1285 5096 521 478 270 690 2194 71 12956 2474 2048 1622 43601 
2009 380 1361 1117 11484 120 . 168 105 1329 4872 577 1152 240 835 2386 63 13147 2464 2026 1986 45812 
2010 376 1444 1065 12991 170 . 175 455 1602 5717 590 1563 270 912 2571 93 12892 2785 2071 2885 50627 
2011 396 1520 1187 16071 176 . 130 4305 1919 5633 567 1316 287 1004 2787 93 13863 2786 2176 4189 60405 
2012 311 1441 1200 17919 159 . 136 9626 2079 5536 595 . 245 1164 2788 87 10013 2957 2343 . 58599 
2013 320 1600 1227 18298 127 . 162 12246 2256 5508 610 . 197 1124 2814 78 15942 3162 2418 4191 72280 
2014 357 1656 1158 17449 164 . 169 11647 2315 5706 575 . 181 1265 2807 106 16418 3366 2400 4991 72730 
2015 371 1545 1108 16958 159 . 181 6791 2341 5472 584 . 188 1364 2854 71 17607 3519 2432 4978 68523 
Total 4861 17102 14766 159537 1544 543 1772 45367 20189 75624 9363 5391 2597 10434 27829 1122 176439 42479 29961 24842 671762 
This table lists the number of firm-months per country and year of our sample with data to replicate Campbell et al.’s (2008) specification. 
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Table B3: Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Analysis 
 EXRET PRICE VOL RELSIZE NIMTA TLMTA CASHMTA MB Unemp. Inflation 
Real 
rate 
Sov 
Spread 
ΔSov 
Spread ΔFX 5Year VIX 
Fed 
Funds TED 
EXRET 1                  
PRICE 0.024 1                 
VOL 0.002 0.057 1                
RELSIZE 0.022 0.589 0.036 1               
NIMTA 0.049 0.098 0.007 0.109 1              
TLMTA -0.067 -0.139 -0.024 -0.155 -0.142 1             
CASHMTA -0.023 -0.188 -0.033 -0.120 0.093 -0.061 1            
MB 0.065 0.165 0.052 0.124 -0.091 -0.466 -0.272 1           
Unemployment 0.010 0.211 0.075 0.351 -0.006 0.003 -0.132 0.084 1          
Inflation -0.025 0.234 0.039 0.089 0.007 0.137 -0.134 0.004 0.219 1         
Real rate 0.010 0.037 0.065 0.074 -0.011 0.110 -0.110 -0.005 0.334 0.113 1        
SovSpread -0.016 0.143 0.033 -0.087 -0.008 0.164 -0.142 -0.035 0.193 0.532 0.151 1       
ΔSovSpread -0.016 -0.027 -0.006 -0.021 0 -0.017 0.010 0.027 -0.014 0.109 -0.078 0.02 1      
ΔFX -0.007 0.017 0.001 -0.026 -0.003 -0.025 -0.009 0.017 -0.016 -0.057 -0.054 -0.067 -0.181 1     
5YEAR -0.017 -0.031 -0.001 0.181 0.015 0.099 -0.057 -0.105 0.110 -0.089 -0.021 -0.218 -0.009 0.052 1    
VIX 0.019 0.035 -0.010 0.090 0.010 0.031 0.020 -0.036 0.019 0.022 0.006 0.042 0.212 -0.080 -0.056 1   
Fed Funds -0.009 -0.084 0.003 0.118 0.018 0.078 -0.044 -0.077 0.096 -0.010 -0.032 -0.179 0.011 0.064 0.888 -0.122 1  
TED spread -0.016 -0.141 0 -0.004 0.022 -0.018 -0.010 0.029 0.046 0.179 -0.077 -0.043 0.140 -0.016 0.336 0.062 0.477 1 
TOL 0.989 0.552 0.988 0.521 0.929 0.670 0.828 0.658 0.727 0.609 0.848 0.621 0.893 0.949 0.184 0.887 0.165 0.653 
VIF 1.011 1.810 1.012 1.918 1.077 1.493 1.207 1.519 1.376 1.643 1.179 1.612 1.12 1.054 5.425 1.127 6.064 1.531 
The last two rows of this table show the Tolerance Value (TOL) and its reciprocal Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). VIF is computed as 1/(1 − 𝑅𝑘
2), where 𝑅𝑘
2 is 
the 𝑅2 value of a regression of factor 𝑘 on all others. TOL is simply 1 − 𝑅𝑘
2. VIF values larger than 10 are typically considered suggestive of multicollinearity in 
a model. The rest of the matrix presents pairwise correlations between all variables in our various specifications. 
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APPENDIX C: LASSO ESTIMATION 
Table C1: Robustness Checks Using LASSO for Variable Selection 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant   -9.213*** 
Excess returns -1.222 -0.159 -1.592*** 
Stock price -0.054 -0.040 -0.166*** 
Volatility of returns -0.065   
Market capitalization -0.082   
Profitability -6.57 -7.372 -6.579*** 
Leverage 2.041 1.438 2.333*** 
Cash -3.717   
Market-to-book ratio 0.087 0.029 0.142*** 
Prior default 2.515 2.630 2.563***     
Unemployment rate 0.032   
Inflation -2.587   
Real interest rate -0.038   
Sovereign spread -0.018       
ΔSovereign spread 0.093   
ΔFX -1.129   
5-year Treasury 0.32 0.058 0.211*** 
VIX 0.009   
Fed funds rate -0.11   
TED spread 0.218       
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.241  0.218 
AUC 0.893  0.911 
Observations 372,158  744,197 
Defaults 522  617      
Column 1 presents coefficients returned by a simple logit estimation of firms’ probability of default on our full set of 
explanatory variables, while Column 2 shows the coefficients returned by the LASSO procedure. Running a logit 
regression only on the variables with nonzero coefficients in Column 2 yields the coefficients and statistics in 
Column 3. In all cases the dependent variable is binary, indicating whether a firm experienced a distress event the 
following month. Pseudo-R^2 refers to McFadden’s Pseudo-R^2, and AUC is the area under the ROC curve. ***, 
**, and * indicate three levels of statistical significance of the coefficients: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, 
respectively. 
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Coefficient path using LASSO for variable selection on our full set of explanatory variables. The vertical axis 
reports the value of the coefficients of the standardized explanatory variables. The lower horizontal axis shows the 
level of λ decreasing from left to right, where a lower λ implies a loosening of the constraint on the sum of the 
absolute value of the coefficients. The numbers at the top of the figure indicate the degrees of freedom or number of 
variables with coefficient different from zero for each level of λ. 
Figure C1: LASSO Coefficient Path
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APPENDIX D: CHAPTER 2 ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table D1: Sample Sales and Country Market Cap and GDP 
  (1) (2) 
Country 
Sales to 
Market Cap 
Market Cap 
to GDP 
Argentina 52% 14% 
Brazil 43% 49% 
Chile 51% 111% 
China 49% 51% 
Colombia 30% 45% 
Eastern Europe 100% 34% 
India 36% 72% 
Indonesia 34% 39% 
Jordan* 27%  
Malaysia 46% 146% 
Mexico 61% 35% 
Morocco* 12%  
Pakistan 107% 16% 
Peru 33% 45% 
Philippines 32% 69% 
Russia 116% 26% 
South Africa 23% 225% 
South Korea 119% 78% 
Taiwan* 93%  
Thailand 59% 75% 
Turkey 68% 31% 
Vietnam 79% 13% 
* No country-level market capitalization data. 
Value shows Sales / GDP instead. 
 
This table shows what percentage of a country’s economy is captured by firms in our sample. Column 1 reports – by 
country – the total sales in firms in our sample divided by the country’s total market capitalization, as measured by 
the World Bank. Column 2 shows the ratio of total market capitalization and GDP in each country. 
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Table D2: Altman’s EM Z-score and Leverage Heat Maps 
  Altman's EM Z-score Leverage 
Country 1996-98 2003-07 2008-14 1996-98 2003-07 2008-14 
Argentina 5.64 7.38 5.62 59% 45% 74% 
Brazil 5.52 6.13 5.88 50% 83% 94% 
Chile 6.44 6.44 6.20 95% 82% 93% 
China 5.39 5.58 5.28 95% 95% 103% 
Colombia 6.71 6.58 6.77 40% 47% 44% 
Eastern Europe 6.38 6.49 6.30 45% 48% 55% 
India 5.14 5.62 5.55 92% 79% 118% 
Indonesia 5.43 6.36 7.13 105% 81% 72% 
Jordan 5.39 5.97 5.14 32% 81%  
Malaysia 5.76 6.95 7.77 69% 69% 63% 
Mexico 7.83 6.26 5.53 54% 59% 89% 
Morocco 7.73 7.47 5.04 28% 42% 128% 
Pakistan 5.07 5.26 5.44 108% 56% 84% 
Peru 6.88 7.23 6.99 53% 53% 68% 
Philippines 5.70 6.02 6.11 98% 103% 131% 
Russia 6.69 8.76 7.60 22% 42% 56% 
South Africa 7.04 6.71 6.88 39% 50% 54% 
South Korea 3.63 5.58 6.11 284% 140% 110% 
Taiwan 6.58 6.80 7.03 65% 66% 66% 
Thailand 5.51 6.21 6.32 172% 84% 83% 
Turkey 7.57 6.30 5.80 95% 104% 124% 
Vietnam   6.51 6.18   95% 116% 
This table shows average Z-scores and leverage for each country over time. The color scale moves from red (for low 
Z-scores and high leverage) to green (for high Z-scores and low leverage), going through several shades of orange 
yellow. 
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Table D3: Estimates of Table 2.5 Model, Asian Financial Crisis Period Defined as 1992-98 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Dep Var: Modified Altman Z score 
    Tradable Non-
Tradable 
𝛽1 (Asian Financial 
Crisis×Leverage) 
-0.249 -0.0376 0.161 0.270 0.0636 
 (0.198) (0.226) (0.348) (0.448) (0.462) 
𝛽2 (Tranquil 
period×Leverage) 
-0.687*** -0.524*** 0.383 0.390 0.393 
 (0.154) (0.173) (0.264) (0.319) (0.371) 
𝛽3 (GFC×Leverage) -0.590*** -0.530*** -0.204 -0.506* 0.213 
 (0.146) (0.160) (0.239) (0.296) (0.345) 
𝛾1 (AFC×EX×Leverage) -1.585* -2.334** -4.804*** -4.912*** -4.868*** 
 (0.915) (0.979) (1.396) (1.851) (1.571) 
𝛾2 (Tranquil×EX×Leverage) -1.665 -2.502 -2.952 -1.377 0.673 
 (1.526) (1.631) (1.937) (2.042) (2.559) 
𝛾3 (GFC×EX×Leverage) 1.191 0.656 0.616 -0.622 2.500 
 (1.470) (1.605) (2.693) (3.112) (3.960) 
Investment  0.0568 0.0453* 0.805 0.0463* 
  (0.0408) (0.0252) (0.507) (0.0270) 
Firm Size  -0.0609*** -1.620*** -1.682*** -1.548*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0891) (0.117) (0.126) 
Constant 30.21*** 31.25***    
 (0.0475) (0.205)    
Observations 9,245 7,351 6,494 6,494 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Country-year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default (the 
modified Z-score), and the explanatory variables are the interactions between leverage and each of three dummy 
variables taking a value of one for the Asian Financial Crisis (1992-1998), tranquil period (2003-2007), and post-
Global Financial Crisis (2008-2014), respectively. These variables are then further interacted with the percentage 
change in the nominal exchange rate (lagged one period). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level in 
parenthesis. 
  
 123 
Table D4: Estimates of Table 2.5 Model, Asian Financial Crisis Period Defined as 1992-98 
and the Post GFC Period as 2009-2013 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Dep Var: Modified Altman Z score 
    Tradable Non-
Tradable 
𝛽1 (Asian Financial 
Crisis×Leverage) 
-0.248 -0.0366 0.162 0.276 0.0660 
 (0.198) (0.226) (0.348) (0.448) (0.462) 
𝛽2 (Tranquil 
period×Leverage) 
-0.609*** -0.466*** 0.409 0.313 0.524 
 (0.143) (0.160) (0.253) (0.307) (0.356) 
𝛽3 (GFC×Leverage) -0.620*** -0.542*** -0.261 -0.494 0.0571 
 (0.155) (0.170) (0.249) (0.306) (0.361) 
𝛾1 (AFC×EX×Leverage) -1.585* -2.330** -4.793*** -4.910*** -4.867*** 
 (0.915) (0.979) (1.396) (1.845) (1.576) 
𝛾2 (Tranquil×EX×Leverage) -0.336 -1.032 -1.158 -2.498 1.831 
 (1.420) (1.519) (2.151) (2.329) (2.520) 
𝛾3 (GFC×EX×Leverage) 0.252 -0.611 -1.711 -3.785 1.518 
 (1.554) (1.699) (2.705) (3.071) (4.162) 
Investment  0.0575 0.0454* 0.808 0.0456* 
  (0.0408) (0.0251) (0.503) (0.0269) 
Firm Size  -0.0597*** -1.622*** -1.688*** -1.547*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0892) (0.117) (0.127) 
Constant 30.21*** 31.23***    
 (0.0475) (0.205)    
Observations 9,245 7,351 6,494 6,494 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Country-year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default (the 
modified Z-score), and the explanatory variables are the interactions between leverage and each of three dummy 
variables taking a value of one for the Asian Financial Crisis (1992-1998), tranquil period (2003-2007), and post-
Global Financial Crisis (2009-2013), respectively. These variables are then further interacted with the percentage 
change in the nominal exchange rate (lagged one period). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level in 
parenthesis. 
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Table D5: Estimates of Table 2.5 Model, Excluding Chinese Firms from Sample 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Dep Var: Modified Altman Z score 
    Tradable Non-
Tradable 
𝛽1 (Asian Financial 
Crisis×Leverage) 
-0.248 -0.0129 0.202 0.355 0.0629 
 (0.222) (0.241) (0.348) (0.464) (0.452) 
𝛽2 (Tranquil 
period×Leverage) 
-0.617*** -0.479*** 0.328 0.316 0.357 
 (0.167) (0.183) (0.273) (0.332) (0.379) 
𝛽3 (GFC×Leverage) -0.587*** -0.489*** -0.156 -0.488 0.286 
 (0.161) (0.173) (0.245) (0.304) (0.355) 
𝛾1 (AFC×EX×Leverage) -2.015** -2.765*** -5.014*** -5.239*** -4.978*** 
 (0.942) (0.996) (1.393) (1.874) (1.542) 
𝛾2 (Tranquil×EX×Leverage) -1.430 -2.491 -3.031 -1.467 0.641 
 (1.521) (1.626) (1.928) (2.037) (2.559) 
𝛾3 (GFC×EX×Leverage) 0.0560 -0.414 -0.0801 -1.178 1.616 
 (1.524) (1.647) (2.731) (3.138) (4.063) 
Investment  0.0537 0.0405 0.269 0.0447 
  (0.0407) (0.0274) (1.355) (0.0277) 
Firm Size  -0.0753*** -1.660*** -1.737*** -1.566*** 
  (0.0122) (0.0904) (0.115) (0.129) 
Constant 30.33*** 31.59***    
 (0.0512) (0.212)    
Observations 9,245 7,351 6,494 6,494 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Country-year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default (the 
modified Z-score), and the explanatory variables are the interactions between leverage and each of three dummy 
variables taking a value of one for the Asian Financial Crisis (1996-1998), tranquil period (2003-2007), and post-
Global Financial Crisis (2008-2014), respectively. Excludes Chinese Firms from sample. These variables are then 
further interacted with the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate (lagged one period). Robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm-level in parenthesis. 
